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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TERRIL CALLIHAM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000169-SC 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3X0 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in removing two prospective jurors for 
cause? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to dismiss a 
prospective juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. State v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1232, 
1240 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979,114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 
1 58, 20 P.3d 342. 
1 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion seeking a 
psychiatric evaluation of Misty Ernst, an eyewitness to the murder? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's refusal to order that a witness submit to a 
psychiatric examination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hubbard, 601 
P.2d 929,930 (Utah 1979); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Utah 1984). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial for the 
admission of the redacted confessions of defendant's brother Jordan? 
Standard of Review. The decision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State 
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 20,999 P.2d 7. However, whether testimony is admitted in violation 
of a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 12,999 P.2d 565 (reviewing for correctness 
whether the judge should have returned the jury for further deliberation or declared a mistrial 
when juror equivocated during jury polling); State v. Gonzales, 989 P.2d 419, 423 (N.M. 
1999) (holding that whether admission of hearsay evidence violates a defendant's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law). Moreover, where a mistrial motion 
rests on an alleged violation of defendant's constitutional rights to confront the witnesses, 
the Court will reverse the conviction for any such error unless it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 
(1969). 
2 
4. Did the trial court commit plain error by reading, without objection, portions of 
Misty Ernst's testimony at the jury's request? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews unpreserved claims for plain error. See State 
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910 
(1995). However, "if a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from 
objecting or has led the trial court into error, [the Court] will then decline to save that party 
from error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 
110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
5. Did the prosecutor's rebuttal argument regarding accomplice liability constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct or otherwise warrant reversal of defendant' s conviction for murder? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews unpreserved claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument for plain error. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 
1992); State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 30, 992 P.2d 951. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretation or application of the following constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules is relevant to a determination of this case: U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-202 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1996); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17; and Utah R. Crim. P. 18. The relevant portions of those provisions are 
reproduced in Addendum A. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant and his brother Jordan Calliham were charged with murder, a first degree 
felony, for the death of James Eaton on April 3, 1999. R. 4, 10, 34. Jordan's girlfriend, 
Misty Ernst, was also charged with the murder of Mr. Eaton. See R. 34,52. However, after 
agreeing to testify for the State, she was allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of 
attempted obstruction of justice. See R. 35, 49, 374: 64-65; R. 368: 6-8. Following a 
preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant and his brother over for trial. R. 27-28.l 
Defendant filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to require Misty Ernst to 
submit to a psychiatric examination. See R. 52, 99. The court denied that motion, finding 
no evidence that Ms. Ernst suffered from a mental illness or was otherwise unable to 
distinguish reality from fiction. See R. 61 -64. Defendant also moved to exclude photographs 
of the victim at the crime scene and during the autopsy. R. 131. The court denied 
defendant's motion with respect to the crime scene photographs, but granted the motion as 
to all but two of the autopsy photographs. R. 372:15-19. Only the crime scene photographs 
were introduced at trial. See R. 374: 127-28. 
Although the information also sought gang and weapons enhancement penalties, 
they were never presented to the jury for its consideration. See R. 10; R. 27-28 (refusing 
to bind defendants over on gang enhancement penalties); R. 378: 9-12 (observing that the 
weapons enhancement was not presented to the jury). 
4 
Defendant also moved to sever his trial from that of his brother Jordan on the ground 
the prosecution intended to introduce Jordan's out-of-court statements. R. 133.2 Although 
the motion represented that a supporting memorandum would be forthcoming, none was filed 
and no ruling from the court appears on the record. See R. 133. However, in an off-the-
record discussion in chambers on the morning of trial, defendant's counsel apparently agreed 
to resolve the issues raised in the motion by requiring that Jordan's out-of-court statements 
be redacted to omit any reference to defendant. See R. 374: 116.3 Jordan's counsel 
apparently objected to that resolution. See R. 374: 116. At the conclusion of the evidence, 
the trial court asked defendant's counsel if he wished to move for a mistrial based on the 
confrontation issues raised in the prior motion to sever. R. 375: 214. After consulting with 
his client, counsel declined. R. 375:215. However, before closing arguments the following 
day, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the admission of Jordan's 
statements to his cellmates, as well as to Misty Ernst, improperly corroborated Misty's 
testimony. R. 375: 9-10. The trial court denied the motion. R. 375: 12-14. 
Following the five-day trial, a jury convicted defendant and his brother Jordan as 
charged. R. 351,373-77. The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of 
2A previous motion to sever was also filed, alleging that the brothers' defenses 
were irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. R. 34-39. The trial court found that 
defendant had not shown their defenses were mutually exclusive and thus denied the 
motion. R. 49-50. Defendant has not appealed that ruling. 
3The resolution of defendant's motion is reflected in that part of the record where 
the court addresses a mistrial motion made by defendant's attorney. See R. 374: 113-21. 
5 
five-years-to-life and ordered that he pay restitution for funeral expenses incurred by the 
victim's family. R. 359-60, 378. Defendant timely appealed. R. 362. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On April 3,1999, Terril and Jordan Calliham murdered 18-year-old James Eaton on 
a remote country road east of Monticello, just west of the Utah-Colorado border. R. 374:40-
41,56;SE13. 
* * * 
In April 1999, defendant and his brother Jordan were residents of Dove Creek, a 
Colorado town about 10 minutes east of the Utah-Colorado border. R. 374: 25; R. 375: 10. 
Jordan was still in high school, but his girlfriend, Misty Ernst, was attending a community 
college in Dove Creek. R. 374:25-26,65-66. The victim was Jordan's best friend. R. 374: 
28,106; R. 375: 25. The three spent a lot of time together, going to lunch nearly every day 
and doing drugs whenever they could. R. 374: 28,31,93-94,106. When Jordan suspected 
that Eaton had stolen drugs from him, Eaton's fortunes took a tragic turn for the worse. R. 
374:31-33,97. 
An Easter Picnic 
On April 3, 1999, the Saturday before Easter Sunday, Jordan and Misty went on a 
picnic with Misty's family in Slick Rock, Colorado. R. 374:26-27. They left the picnic near 
7:30 that evening, returning to the Calliham home in Dove Creek between 8:00 and 8:15 p.m. 
R. 374: 27,100. The two had made plans with defendant to go to Cortez after they returned 
from the picnic to buy drugs from one of Jordan's friends. R. 374: 28, 30-31, 34, 66-67. 
6 
Defendant, however, was not home when the two returned, so they awaited his arrival. See 
R. 374: 29-30. In the meantime, Jordan called Eaton, informing him of their plans. See R. 
374:100. Eaton's grandfather dropped him off at the Calliham home at 8:30 or shortly after. 
R. 374: 29, 86; R. 375: 37-38, 42. Eaton borrowed Misty's car so that he could drive to a 
friend's home to get some money. R. 374: 29, 86,100; see also R. 375: 158. While he was 
away, Terril returned home and showered. R. 374: 30, 86. Eaton returned ten or fifteen 
minutes later. R. 374: 29, 86. 
Going to Monticello for Drugs 
Just after 9:00, all four left in Misty's car. R. 374: 30, 34, 86; see also R. 375: 167. 
However, rather than driving toward Cortez, they traveled west on U.S. Highway 666 toward 
Monticello, Utah because Misty believed they could buy drugs cheaper there. R. 374:30-31, 
34,36; see also R. 375: 158. On the way to Monticello, Eaton suggested they smoke a joint 
of marijuana. R. 374: 35. Jordan, however, whispered to Misty to not let them smoke in the 
car because her mother would have the car the next day. R. 374: 34; see also R. 375: 158. 
Because Jordan always smoked in the car, Misty found the request odd and concluded that 
Terril and Jordan intended to confront Eaton about the stolen drugs and perhaps beat him up. 
R. 374: 34-35. 
When Misty told Eaton they could not smoke in the car, Eaton suggested they turn 
onto Ucolo Road which was approximately one mile inside the Utah border. R. 374:35,123. 
Misty did so, and, after driving north some 200 yards, turned around and parked along side 
a barbed wire fence near a grove of trees just off the road. R. 374: 35-38. The three men 
7 
exited the car, but Misty remained as she smoked a cigarette. R. 374: 39; see also R. 375: 
158-59. Defendant asked to wear Eaton's coat because it was cold. R. 374: 39. After 
defendant put on the coat, he and Jordan walked beyond the fence into the grove of trees 
some 60 feet off the road to smoke a joint. R. 374:39,124,163; R. 375: 37; see also R. 375: 
163. As defendant and Jordan walked into the trees, Eaton spoke with Misty, asking her to 
join them. R. 374: 39; see also R. 375: 159. Concerned that the brothers were going to 
"rough up" Eaton and not wanting to be present at the time, Misty declined, insisting that she 
wanted to finish her cigarette. R. 374: 39. Eaton questioned the brothers for walking so far 
from the car to smoke a joint, but followed them into the trees when they beckoned him to 
join them. R. 374: 39-40. 
The Murder 
After the three men walked into the grove of trees, Misty heard them laughing. R. 
374: 40-41. A few minutes later, Misty heard a gunshot. R. 374: 41; see also R. 375: 160. 
Fifteen or more gunshots followed in rapid succession. R. 374:41; see also R. 375:160. A 
few seconds later, another shot fired. R. 374: 41; see also R. 375: 160. During the volley 
of shots, Misty heard the cries of Eaton, asking why they were killing him. R. 374: 56; see 
also R. 375:160-61. After the final shot, Misty heard nothing and defendant and Jordan ran 
back to the car. R. 374:41-42. 
On the way back to the car, Terril cut his knuckles on the barbed wire fence and 
Jordan tore a hole in his pants, scratching his leg. R. 374: 57-58,209; see also R. 375: 161. 
When Misty asked if Eaton was dead, Jordan responded that "he finished James off in the 
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head." R. 374:41-43; c/R. 375:161,166. Jordan related how Eaton tried to shield himself 
from the bullets with his hands. R. 374: 59. He also explained that he fired the last bullet 
after clearing a jam. R. 374: 43-44; see also R. 375: 164. Terril told Misty that he thought 
for a moment he would have to kick Eaton over onto the ground because Eaton did not 
initially fall when he shot him. R. 374: 59. 
Covering Their Tracks 
While they drove back to Dove Creek, Terril told Misty and Jordan to go to Cortez 
to establish an alibi. R. 374: 47-48; R. 375: 9-10. Terril would remain in Dove Creek. R. 
374: 47-48; R. 375: 9-10. They arrived in Dove Creek between 9:30 and 9:45. R. 374: 48, 
86. Just after 10:00, Misty and Jordan set off for Cortez. R. 374: 48, 86. Some ten miles 
into the trip, Jordan called Terril on his cell phone to make it appear they were already in 
Cortez. R. 374: 49,122. The two arrived in Cortez between 10:30 and 10:45. R. 374: 48, 
86. In Cortez, they visited one of Jordan's friends for approximately 15 minutes. R. 374: 50, 
86. After that, they visited Michael Gentry, another of Jordan's friends. R. 374: 50,86,147. 
Misty remained in the car while Jordan went inside to speak with Gentry. R. 374: 50. When 
Gentry asked Jordan how things were going in Dove Creek, Jordan told him that he had had 
some problems, but said he had solved them. R. 374:146-47. As he spoke, Jordan gestured 
with his hand as if he were pulling the trigger of a gun. R. 374: 146-47. Before leaving, 
Jordan told Gentry to tell anyone who inquired that Jordan was there that night. R. 374:148. 
When Jordan returned to the car nearly an hour later, he told Misty he had told Gentry "what 
him and Terril had done." R. 374: 50, 86,148. 
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The two returned to the Calliham home in Dove Creek some time after midnight. R. 
374: 51. There, Misty saw the murder weapons for the first time when Jordan retrieved both 
blood-splattered guns. R. 374: 51-52; see R. 375: 93. Jordan cleaned the blood off his gun, 
but left the other for Terril to clean. R. 374: 51-52. 
Murder Investigation 
When Eaton did not return home as expected, his family filed a missing persons report 
with the Dolores County, Colorado Sheriffs Office. R. 375: 8. Eaton's disappearance 
remained a mystery until a passing motorist spotted his frozen body six days later. R. 374: 
130-31,137-38; R. 375: 31, 95. 
Autopsy and Firearms Analysis. An autopsy confirmed that Eaton had died from 
multiple gunshot wounds to the head, torso, and extremities. R. 375: 81. The autopsy 
revealed that at least nineteen bullets penetrated Eaton's body, including a single shot to the 
face fired at close range. See R. 375: 75-80, 84. The medical examiner found projectile 
injuries to the heart and aorta, both lungs, the liver, the small and large intestine, the right 
kidney, and the spine. R. 375: 80-81. He concluded that any one of the four injuries to the 
aorta would have caused death. R. 375: 81-82. He also recovered a bullet from the base of 
the skull, which corresponded to the single entrance wound to Eaton's face. R. 375: 82-84. 
Although that bullet did not penetrate the brain, the medical examiner concluded it was 
potentially fatal because it caused hemorrhaging around the brain. R. 375: 83-85. The 
medical examiner opined that Eaton was first shot just beneath the ribs on his right side. R. 
375: 76, 83-84, 89. The final shot was likely to the face. R. 375: 43, 85, 89-90. 
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Police recovered twenty-one 9 mm shell casings and parts of four different bullet slugs 
within nine feet of Eaton's body. R. 374: 133,138; R. 375: 49. A firearms examiner from 
the Utah State Crime Lab confirmed that the casings originated from two different weapons. 
R. 375: 52,55. Ten casings were fired from a Smith & Wesson 9 mm Sigma. R. 375: 53-55, 
60. The remaining ten casings were fired from a different weapon, but the gun's brand and 
model could not be determined. R. 375: 54, 60.4 
Police Interviews. Three days after Eaton's body was discovered, a press release 
issued indicating that Eaton's body had been discovered beside Ucolo Road and announcing 
the joint investigation into his death by the Dolores and San Juan counties' sheriffs' offices. 
SE13. Further details surrounding Eaton's death were withheld by the two offices in the 
hope it would facilitate the apprehension of the killers. R.375:16-18,21-22,95-96,102-03. 
Two weeks later, investigators received a major break in the case when Misty Ernst 
finally came forward. On April 27th, Sergeant John Kimball of the Millard County Sheriffs 
Office questioned Misty in a tape-recorded interview in Dove Creek. R. 374:154-55,R. 375: 
8-9. Misty initially denied knowing anything about Eaton's murder. R. 374: 156. But after 
Sgt. Kimball gave Misty a so-called "father/daughter talk about telling the truth," she 
intimated for the first time that she knew something about the murder, asking, "What if I so 
much didn't see it as I heard it? What if I heard things." R. 374: 157. Sgt. Kimball then 
addressed two concerns raised by Misty—her safety and the potential legal consequences she 
4The 21st casing was lost when the fingerprint examiner accidentally spilled the 
casings onto the floor. R. 374: 142; R. 375: 58. 
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faced for her involvement. R. 374: 157-58. After Sgt. Kimball addressed those concerns, 
Misty gave a statement, much of which was corroborated by the evidence already discovered 
bypolice. R.374: 158-60; R. 375:9-10,19. Later that day, Misty answered more questions 
in a videotaped interview in Monticello. R. 374: 155. Although Misty provided additional 
details of the murder during the second interview, her story was largely consistent with that 
given in the first interview. See R. 374: 160-66; but see R. 374: 169. 
Defendant was twice interviewed by Sheriff Jerry Martin of the Dolores County 
Sheriffs Office. R. 375: 11. Defendant claimed he had been hauling hay with a friend on 
the evening of the murder until approximately 7:30. R. 375: 12-13. He claimed that after 
hauling hay, he went home to clean up before going to another friend's house where he 
remained the rest of the evening. R. 375: 13. In interviews with the St. George Police 
Department, Terril admitted that on his return trip to Dove Creek from St. George at the end 
of March, he brought with him at least six handguns, including a Smith & Wesson 9 mm 
Sigma semi-automatic pistol. R. 374: 151-52. 
Jailhouse Confessions. More than eight months after Eaton's body was discovered, 
two of Jordan's cellmates told police that Jordan had admitted to them that he shot Eaton. 
R. 374: 185-90, 193-97. Another cellmate told police Jordan admitted that he and his 
girlfriend were present when the murder took place. R. 374: 181; R. 389.5 
5The statements to the three cellmates also implicated Terril, but the statements 
were redacted at trial to omit any reference to Terril. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Removal of Prospective Jurors. The trial court properly removed prospective jurors 
No. 8 and No. 53. Defendant concedes that the prospective jurors' responses to a jury 
questionnaire raised an inference of bias. However, he contends that the inference of bias 
was rebutted by their later assurances in voir dire that they could judge impartially. 
Assurances alone, however, are not sufficient to rebut an inference of bias. Those assurances 
must be weighed against the balance of the prospective jurors' voir dire responses. Juror No. 
8 was a close personal friend of the defendants' family. Although he believed he could 
nevertheless be fair, his voir dire responses revealed the very real conflict he would endure 
because of his relationship with the defendant's family. Juror No. 53, an attorney, consulted 
one of the defense attorneys on a motion in this case. She also held deeply held opinions 
regarding the appropriate proseuction of young offenders and was never able to state, with 
any degree of confidence, that she would in fact be able to judge fairly and impartially. The 
trial court did not therefore abuse its discretion in removing the two prospective jurors. 
In any event, defendant was not prejudiced by their removal. The jury was passed for 
cause. Nothing more is required. Requiring reversal whenever a court improvidently 
removes a juror would be counterproductive to the Court's long-held policy that trial courts 
should err on the side of caution when determining whether a prospective juror should be 
removed. Moreover, an improvident removal does not constitute a de facto peremptory 
challenge to the other side, nor does it violate a defendant's constitutional right to confront 
the witnesses against him as he suggests. 
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Request fora MentalExamination. Defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing 
to order a mental examination of Misty Ernst, who was present at the scene when the victim 
was murdered. Ordering a mental examination of a witness is rare and is justified only if a 
substantial doubt exists that the witness is not competent to testify—i.e., that she is unable 
to perceive, remember, or relate events or does not appreciate the obligation to tell the truth. 
This burden is greater than that required to obtain already existing mental health records. 
Defendant presented no evidence that Misty had been diagnosed or was being treated 
for a mental illness. The only hint of mental illness was Misty5s adoption of counsel's 
characterization of her dreams of the victim as hallucinations. No evidence was introduced 
explaining what hallucinations are, the possibility that someone like Misty could be suffering 
from them, or the effect they may have on a person's ability to perceive, remember, and 
relate events. Although Misty's accounts of the events surrounding the murder differed in 
some respects, the differences were minimal and adequately explained by Misty's fear of 
retribution by defendants and her concern over the consequences of her own involvement. 
Moreover, Misty's account of the murder was substantially corroborated by evidence 
gathered by police unknown to the public. 
Jordan's Redacted Admissions. Defendant abandoned his motion for severance, 
agreeing instead to the admission of Jordan's redacted statements to cellmates which omitted 
all reference to defendant. He cannot therefore challenge any failure of the court to sever the 
brothers' trials on that ground. 
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For the same reason, defendant was precluded from relying on the admission of 
Jordan's redacted statements as a ground for mistrial. In any event, those redacted statements 
comported with established Supreme Court precedent. Accomplice confessions directly 
inculpating a defendant cannot be admitted into evidence in a joint trial. However, those 
admissions can be admitted against the accomplice in the same trial if they are redacted to 
omit all reference to the defendant and the jury is given an appropriate limiting instruction. 
That was done here. Misty Ernst's testimony of a statement by Jordan, which arguably 
inculpated defendant, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Re-reading of Some Testimony. When the jury sent a second note to the judge 
requesting a transcript of a portion of Misty's testimony, the trial court decided to read the 
relevant portions to the jury. Because defendant did not object, he waived any challenge 
thereto on appeal. Even on the merits, defendant's claim fails. The rules of evidence do not 
forbid a court from re-reading portions of a witness's testimony. That authority lies within 
the discretion of the trial court. The trial court here correctly determined what testimony the 
jury requested and re-read that testimony. Any failure to sua sponte include additional 
testimony was harmless. 
Prosecutor's Argument on Accomplice Liability. In his rebuttal argument, the 
prosecutor argued, without objection, that defendant could be found guilty as an accomplice. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, nothing in the prosecutor's argument implied that defendant 
could be convicted without the requisite intent for murder or for simply being present during 
the murder. In any event, any arguable misstatement by the prosecutor was not obvious, nor 
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was it prejudicial. Moreover, the jury was instructed not to consider any statements by 
counsel as evidence. For the same reasons, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim also fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REMOVED TWO PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS FOR CAUSE 
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in removing for cause prospective 
jurors No. 8 and No. 53. Aplt. Brf. at 36-59. He contends their removal was not warranted 
because both jurors satisfactorily responded to the voir dire inquiries regarding their 
expressed biases. Aplt. Brf. at 45-52.6 He further argues that he was harmed by their 
removal because it "effectively gave the prosecutor two additional peremptory challenges." 
Aplt. Brf. at 52-59. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WAS NOT 
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF REASONABILITY, 
"Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused 
the right to a fair and impartial jury." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 36, 24 P.3d 948 {citing 
U.S. Const, amend. VI & Utah Const, art. I, § 12). Thus, "based on the juror's expressed 
feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the trial court must determine by a process of logic and 
reason, based upon common experience, whether the juror can stand in attitude of 
6The transcript of the voir dire of the two prospective jurors is reproduced in 
Addendum B. 
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indifference between the state and the accused." State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 
1981). Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, identifies fourteen specific circumstances 
upon which a juror may be challenged for cause. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e). For example, 
prospective jurors may be removed if they harbor beliefs or attitudes that will prevent them 
from acting impartially. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13), (14). Bias will also be found if the 
juror is related to the victim or has a relationship with a party or witness which compromises 
his or her ability to judge impartially. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(3), (4). 
In assessing whether a prospective juror should be removed for cause, the trial court 
applies the following test: 
Once comments are made which facially raise a question of partiality or 
prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed 
by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the 
inference rebutted; rebuttal of such an inference may be accomplished by a 
showing that the statement was merely the product of a "light impression" and 
not one that would "close the mind against the testimony that may be offered 
in opposition." 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988) {quoting Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 
1980)); accord Wach, 2001 UT 35, at f 27. Moreover, "[w]hen a prospective juror expresses 
an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an impartial verdict 
cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 
1987). 
In reviewing a trial court's removal of a prospective juror, the reviewing court 
"look[s] to the entire voir dire exchange with the challenged juror." State v. Lajferty, 2001 
UT 19, f 58,20 P.3d 342. As with other fact sensitive determinations, the trial judge is in an 
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"'advantaged position in determining which persons would be fair and impartial jurors.'" 
Wach, 2001 UT 35, at f 25 {quoting Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981)). 
Accordingly, "the trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in determining the 
qualifications of jurors." State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799,802 (Utah 1977); accord Wach 2001 
UT 35, at f 25 (affording the judge's decision "just deference"). That discretion, however, 
is measured against "the ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by the simple 
expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to 
question." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,151,992 P.2d 951. Thus, a trial court's removal 
of a prospective juror will be deemed an abuse of discretion only if it "'was beyond the limits 
of reasonability." State v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah) {quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 476 
(1993). 
1. The Trial Court Properly Removed Prospective Juror No, 8. 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in removing prospective juror 
No. 8, a close friend of the defendants' family. Aplt. Brf. at 49-52. Defendant asserts that 
although juror No. 8 conceded that his relationship with the defendants' family may be 
affected by his service, it was error to remove him because of his expressed commitment to 
the principle that the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Brf. at 50-52. 
A review of the court's voir dire reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Rule 18 provides that a challenge for cause is proper if a social relationship exists 
which, "when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
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juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4). Prospective juror No. 8 revealed in the responses to his jury 
questionnaire that he was "close personal friends" with defendants' paternal and maternal 
grandparents. See R. 373: 52; see also R. 370:16-17. He also said he could not be impartial 
because of his friendship with the family. R. 373: 52. Juror No. 8's friendship with the 
family, and his initial expression that it would hinder his ability to be impartial, raised an 
inference of bias requiring removal or rehabilitation. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. 
Further inquiry did not dispel the suggestion of bias. When asked whether his 
relationship with the family would make it impossible to be fair to both sides, juror No. 8 
responded, "I think that I could be fair, but I think that I would have a very hard time [ ] 
serving in that capacity." R. 373: 52. The court then asked whether it would simply make 
him "really uncomfortable," to which he responded that that was "basically it." R. 373: 52. 
When the court asked if he would hesitate to find defendants guilty—grandchildren of close 
personal friends, juror No. 8 responded: 
I would hesitate, yes. But beyond a reasonable doubt, I think that the courts 
are set up that way and that's what I believed all my life. If it was beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then I think that I would have to. 
R. 373: 52-53. Upon further inquiry, juror No. 8 said he would think twice no matter who 
was being tried. R. 373: 53. The court then asked whether it would be irrelevant to him that 
he knows the grandparents, to which he replied: 
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Basically and honestly I think that it might affect me in the very long run either 
way. That's why I put that on the questionnaire. I know these people. 
They're my friends. There's a difference from between to me of being 
somebody else's friend and their being my friend. I consider them my friends. 
R. 373: 53-54. In other words, juror No. 8 acknowledged that his service on the jury would 
affect his relationship whether he voted to convict defendants or acquit them. "[W]hen 
viewed objectively,... reasonable minds" could have little confidence that prospective juror 
No. 8 would be able to set aside his friendship and "return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism." See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4). 
Although juror No. 8 later represented he would adhere to the "beyond the reasonable 
doubt" standard and be able to convict if the State met that burden, he again conceded that 
it would be "difficult." R. 373: 54-55. When the prosecutor asked whether his hesitation to 
convict would render him partial or unfair, he responded that he "d[id]n't believe so." R. 
373: 56. He explained that if they were his friends, they would understand. R. 373: 57. 
However, he then expressed some concern regarding his ability to maintain his convictions 
in the face of a hung jury: 
One of the things that I have really thought about being in here and sitting 
here, I think probably the worst thing that I could think of is if I wasn't 
convinced and everybody else was, it would not be fair to the defendants for 
me to hang this hearing. I don't think I could do that. 
R. 373: 57. After so stating, he talked himself out of any concern that he could not maintain 
such a personal conviction: 
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I think that everybody in there is going to have to have enough evidence 
presented that they will believe beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't think this 
is going—in most juries it is very clear cut where you have whether you have 
that reasonable doubt or not basically. I have found that, you know, you'll 
present much more evidence to or against and so I think that, you know, in 
order to be fair and impartial, you have to look at both sides. And I have 
thought about that and I think that would be a disservice if I didn't believe that 
there was a reasonable doubt to go ahead with the State. If I did believe that 
there was a reasonable doubt in my own heart, I would have to rule the other 
way. And this is what's gone through my mind since I got this summons. 
R. 373: 56-57. Through this exchange, juror No. 8 exposed the real conflict he suffered as 
he contemplated his ability to serve impartially given his close friendship with defendants' 
family. His insistence that he would not be affected by his friendship, however sincere, was 
ultimately not convincing. 
This Court addressed a similar situation in Brooks, 563 P.2d at 801, where the trial 
court refused to remove two jurors who were close friends of prosecution witnesses. 
Although both indicated they could set aside their friendships and serve without bias, the 
Court held that "[a] juror is not in any position to weigh the evidence of his friend against the 
evidence of strangers and of the defendant so as to strike a balance between them as the law 
requires, viz., stand indifferent between the state and the accused." Id. at 801-02. The Court 
concluded that the trial court's failure to remove the two jurors was an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 802. In so concluding, the Court held that "[w]here there have been personal 
associations, such as the ones here[,] to remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced[ 
] runs counter to human nature. One cannot be deemed indifferent or impartial." Id. 
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Likewise here, notwithstanding juror No. 8's sincere commitment to be fair, he could 
not reasonably be expected to "remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced" given his 
close personal friendship with defendants' family. Id. Prospective juror No. 8's friendship 
with defendants' family was not one that could easily be set aside. It was not a passing 
acquaintance, but a close personal friendship. The effect his service would have on his 
relationship could not be discounted. See R. 373: 53-54. Juror No. 8fs discomfort in serving 
as a juror "went beyond the discomfort that many jurors experience when rendering 
judgment." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 50. As such, the Court was duty bound to remove 
him. See id. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Removed Prospective Juror No. 53. 
Defendant also complains of the trial court's removal of prospective juror No. 53, an 
attorney who had served as opposing counsel in cases involving both the prosecutor and 
Jordan's attorney. Aplt. Brf. at 45-49; R. 373: 172-74,178. Defendant argues that she was 
qualified to serve as a juror because she honestly revealed her potential biases, but indicated 
she could nevertheless act impartially. Aplt. Brf. at 46-47. A review of the entire voir dire 
exchange reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing her. 
Consulting Defense Counsel on a Motion. Rule 18 makes the existence of any legal, 
business, or other relationship between a prospective juror and any party a ground for 
removal if the "relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4). Juror No. 53 revealed that she had discussed a 
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change of venue motion in this case with Jordan's attorney. R. 373:172. Although they did 
not discuss the "specifics" of the case, she gave Jordan's attorney "some ideas" on how to 
proceed. R. 373: 172-73. The court of appeals has observed that "[a] juror's relationship 
with a party's legal counsel may be sufficient to raise a question of bias." State v. Cox, 826 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1992). Having aligned herself with defendants' cause, however 
minimally, juror No. 53 placed herself in a position reasonably suggesting that she would be 
unable to return a verdict free of bias. 
Juror No. 53 was also present in court during several pretrial motions involving 
defendants. R. 373: 179. Although she did not recall the issues, facts at trial may have 
refreshed her recollection. If the pretrial motions concerned matters that would not go before 
the jury, as is often the case, they too could have improperly influenced her decision making. 
In short, her familiarity with the case and her assistance to the defense in the case, "would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return 
a verdict which would be free of favoritism." See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4). 
Concerns Over the Prosecution and Disposition of Young Offenders. A prospective 
juror is also subject to removal if "a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent [her] from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging." Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(e)( 14). In her response to a jury questionnaire, juror No. 53 wrote she "wouldn't be able 
to pass judgment" on the youngest defendant (Jordan) because he would "most likely be 
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victimized" in prison. SeeR. 373: 171,116-11.7 Clearly, the consequences of a conviction 
have no bearing on whether the defendant is guilty of a crime—the issue before the jury. See 
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (observing that jurors should not consider 
matters which "suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an 
emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror"). As noted 
by the court of appeals, "jurors' minds should be free of extraneous thoughts as to possible 
sentences because such thoughts would tend to interfere with their concentration on 
defendant's guilt or innocence." Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah App. 
1990); accord State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,296 (Utah 1988) (observing that the "length 
of a possible sentence is generally thought to be irrelevant to the issue of guilt or 
innocence"). Thus, juror No. 53's response that she "wouldn't be able to pass judgment" due 
to the defendant's youth raised an inference of partiality requiring removal or rehabilitation. 
See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. 
Further inquiry did not rebut the inference of partiality. Although juror No. 53 
retreated somewhat from her initial representation that she "wouldn't be able to pass 
judgment," her retreat was not far enough. She explained that she thought she "would have 
a hard time being impartial, because of his youth." R. 373: 171 (emphasis added). When 
again queried about her response, she said, "I've given a lot of thought to this. I think I 
7The responses to the questionnaire are not included in the record on appeal. 
However, the substance of some responses are revealed in the voir dire questioning. 
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would have a hard time." R. 373: 171 (emphasis added). The issue was further explored by 
defendant's attorney: 
Counsel Are you saying then-let me understand-that you don't think 
you could listen to the evidence in this case and listen to 
Judge Anderson's instructions and be a fair and impartial 
juror? 
Juror No. 53 I thought—I think it would be difficult, but I think I would do 
that. I certainly do that in other contexts]. In my own 
practice of law I do that where I set my feelings aside. 
Counsel A lot of things we do are real difficult to do. 
Juror No. 53 Yes. 
Counsel But your statement is that in spite of that difficulty, you could 
follow his instruction then you could listen to the evidence 
and be a fair and impartial juror to both sides. 
Juror No. 53 I think so. I think probably more so in this type of case I 
would be fair to both sides. 
R. 373:172-73 (emphasis added). These responses did nothing to dispel the concern that she 
could not judge impartially. Each time, she equivocated in her confidence that she would 
judge fairly and impartially, stating only that she thought she could do so and reiterating that 
it would be difficult. 
Later in voir dire, she reiterated that "it would be real hard" to pass judgment on 
Jordan, explaining that "it's hard to make a decision when someone's sent up and feeling like 
a decision against him or making a harsh judgment would [affect] him for the rest of his life." 
R. 373: 177. Referring to her response on the questionnaire, she further explained: "I just 
tried to indicate anything that I thought might make me not an impartial juror. I don't know 
that that would be definitely the way I would go. I think I could listen to Judge Anderson's 
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instructions." R. 373: 177. Again her assurances are enveloped in doubt. She could not 
even express great confidence that she could follow the court's instructions. 
Moreover, prospective juror No. 53 later disclosed that she had seen the two brothers 
in court on prior occasions and was "struck by the youth of both." R. 373: 179. Therefore, 
her concerns regarding the prosecution of young offenders also extended to defendant. Her 
extraneous concerns regarding the treatment of young offenders was further exasperated by 
her mistaken belief that defendants faced a term of 15-years-to-life in prison, rather than 5-
years-to-life. R. 373: 180-81. 
When further pressed by Jordan's attorney, juror No. 53 finally indicated that she 
would be able to find the defendants guilty if the prosecution proved the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. R. 373: 178. She responded affirmatively when counsel asked her if she 
could "absolutely" do so. R. 373: 178. However, as noted above, "[w]hen a prospective 
juror expresses an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an 
impartial verdict cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." Jones, 734 P.2d at 475; 
accord Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884. Although juror No. 53 responded affirmatively to the last 
question posed by Jordan's attorney, that was not enough. See Wach, 2001 UT 35, at f 33 
(holding "[i]t is not enough if a juror believes that he or she can be impartial and fair"). "A 
statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning 
in light of [her] other testimony and facts which suggest bias." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 
533, 536 (Utah 1981). 
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As explained, juror No. 53 consistently maintained only that she thought she could 
serve impartially and never retracted her response that it would be "difficult" or "hard" to do 
so. Thus, her responses provided no assurance that she would in fact accomplish the 
"difficult" task of serving without bias. Prospective juror No. 53 instead revealed deeply 
held attitudes, feelings, and opinions that placed in serious question her ability to be fair and 
impartial. For example, she acknowledged her disagreement with the prosecutor's approach 
to drug cases involving young offenders, believing they should be given a second chance. 
R. 373: 174. She then admitted that "it's harder" for her to pass judgment in any case 
involving young offenders, though she did not believe that they automatically deserved a 
second chance because of their youth. R. 373:174-75. The depth of her feelings was further 
revealed in the admittedly "heated" exchanges she had had with the prosecutor over the issue. 
R. 373:175-76. She even admitted to having told him that he was "ruining the lives of these 
young people" by not giving them a second chance in drug cases. R. 373: 174. 
Juror No. 53 expressed her belief that she would be fair "more so in this type of case." 
R. 373: 173. Although she did not elaborate on that, she later indicated her understanding 
that this case "isn't a drug case." R. 373: 174. However, as a juror, she would have learned 
that the State alleged the murder was motivated by drugs. Given her disagreement with the 
prosecutor's policy in pursuing young drug offenders and her general rancor towards him, 
it is not unreasonable to believe that juror No. 53 would have questioned the propriety of 
pursuing first degree murder against these young defendants, rather than a lesser charge. 
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Although prospective Juror No. 53 minimized the depth of her rancor towards the 
prosecutor over this issue, the trial court suggested that it was significant. After the court 
held it would strike her for cause, the prosecutor noted his relief that he would not be 
required to comment on their acrimonious relationship. R. 373: 182. In response, the trial 
court stated: "Okay. I've been in court and seen the two of you together. Tell her she can 
go." R. 373: 182. In other words, the court found from its own experience that the 
acrimonious relationship between the two placed in doubt her ability to serve free of bias. 
A parallel can be drawn to the challenged juror in State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,992 
P.2d 951. In that case, this Court held that a prospective juror who had been sexually abused 
by a boyfriend should have been removed for cause in a trial charging a father with sexually 
abusing his nine-year-old daughter. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at fflf 2-5, 48. Although the 
prospective juror said that sitting as ajuror "'might make [her] uncomfortable,'" she testified 
that her experience "'would not affect [her] ability to be fair and keep in remembrance he is 
innocent until proven guilty.'" Id. at f 48 {quoting from the record). Emphasizing "that trial 
judges should err on the side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges," the Court 
concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to remove the prospective 
juror for cause. Id. at 51. In so concluding, the Court observed: 
[D]espite [the prospective juror's] sincere commitment to be fair, it was clearly 
possible that her personal traumatic experience might affect her neutrality in 
some way because, as she stated, making a decision would make her 
"uncomfortable" for reasons that went beyond the discomfort that many jurors 
experience when rendering judgment. 
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Id. at f 50. Likewise in this case, despite juror No. 53?s sincere commitment to be fair, it was 
clearly possible that her personal biases regarding the appropriate pursuit of young offenders 
might affect her neutrality in some way because, as she stated, being fair and impartial would 
be "difficult" for reasons that went beyond the difficulty that many jurors experience when 
rendering judgment. 
Before removing juror No. 53, the trial court indicated that it would not remove her 
if the prosecutor so desired. R. 373: 182. Defendant argues that it is "rather unlikely" the 
court would have given the prosecutor the option of retaining juror No. 53 if it "truly 
believed that [she] was unqualified to serve." Aplt. Brf. at 49. As this Court recently 
observed, "jury selection is more art than science," and therefore, counsel has "the right to 
identify and prefer particular jurors without regard to any particular objective criterion or 
philosophy of jury selection." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ffl[ 21,23,12 P.3d 92. If a 
party chooses to retain a prospective juror "for whom [it] arguably possessed a sufficient 
basis to challenge for cause," the trial court does not act unreasonably in respecting that 
party's decision. Id. atf 31. 
* * * 
In sum, the two prospective jurors acknowledged biases that were not attenuated by 
further voir dire. Their removal was based on close relationships with those involved in the 
case, as well as deeply held attitudes—not "light impressions." See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. 
Certainly, it cannot be said that their removal was "beyond the limits of reasonability." 
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Archuletta, 850 P.2d at 1240 (internal quotes omitted). Indeed, the trial court may well have 
abused its discretion if had not excused them. 
B. REMOVAL OF THE TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS DID NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in removing the 
two jurors, the conviction cannot be reversed unless defendant can show the error was 
harmful. Archuletta, 850 P.2d at 1240. This defendant cannot do. 
1. No Biased Jurors Sat on the Jury. 
This Court long ago reaffirmed that "it is not reversible error to exclude a juror for an 
insufficient cause if an impartial and unobjectionable jury is afterward obtained." State v. 
Seyboldt, 65 Utah 204, 236 P. 225, 228 (Utah 1925) (internal quotations omitted).8 That 
holding has never been overruled by this Court. See, e.g, Archuletta, 850 P.2d at 1240 
(holding that even if trial court abuses its discretion in granting motion to dismiss a juror for 
cause, the reviewing court "will reverse only if [it] find[s] that the error is harmful"). 
Defendant makes no claim that the jurors who sat were not fair and impartial. See Aplt. Brf. 
at 52-59. Indeed, defendant passed each of the sitting jurors for cause. R. 373:70,109,111, 
131,140, 194,210,215. This fact is fatal to any claim that defendant was prejudiced by an 
improvident removal. 
8The Court added that this is particularly true "where the excepting party has not 
exhausted the peremptory challenges to which he is entitled/1 Seyboldt, 236 P. at 228 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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2. The "Automatic Reversal Rule" Espoused by Defendant Cuts Against 
the Policy that Courts Should Err on the Side of Caution. 
Defendant asks the Court to presume prejudice for the improvident removal of a 
prospective juror. Aplt. Brf. at 56. He thus seeks the adoption of a rule making any 
improper removal for cause reversible error. Such a rule is contrary to well-established 
precedent and would place an undue and impractical burden on trial judges. The rule 
espoused by defendant is similar to the automatic reversal rule once applied by this Court in 
cases where the trial court improperly denied a for-cause challenge. Under that rule, reversal 
was automatic whenever a defendant was compelled to use a peremptory challenge to remove 
a prospective juror whom the trial court should have stricken for cause, but did not. See 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. This 
Court rejected the automatic reversal rule in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994), 
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995). The Court held that "[t]o prevail on a 
claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate 
prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." 
In Menzies, the Court opted to require a showing of actual prejudice, i.e., a biased 
juror served, over its history of "straining" to uphold "questionable for-cause determinations" 
where the jury was otherwise impartial. Id. at 400. In this way, the Court could more readily 
provide guidance to trial courts by condemning a failure to remove a biased juror without 
upsetting an otherwise valid verdict by an impartial jury. The Court thus reinforced its long-
held policy that trial courts should "obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the 
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prospective juror and selecting another." Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536. The Court has recently 
reaffirmed that policy, directing trial judges to "err on the side of caution in ruling on for-
cause challenges." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 51. This expedient applies to prospective 
jurors of questionable bias for either the defendant or the prosecution. 
In support of an automatic reversal rule, defendant relies on this Court's decisions in 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), and Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 
346 (Utah 1997). Aplt. Brf. at 53-57. The civil plaintiffs in Randle and Carrier were each 
suing multiple defendants for negligently causing an automobile accident resulting in death, 
Randle, 862 P.2d at 1331-32, or serious injury, Carrier, 944 P.2d at 349. In each case, the 
issue on appeal was whether the trial court erroneously granted the defendants separate sets 
of peremptory challenges under rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Randle, 862 P.2d 
at 1332; Carrier, 944 P.2d at 349-50. In both Randle and Carrier, this Court concluded the 
trial court in each case erroneously granted the multiple defendants a three-to-one edge over 
the plaintiff in peremptory challenges, rather than a two-to-one edge as permitted under the 
"substantial controversy" test. Randle, 862 P.2d at 1333-34; Carrier, 944 P.2d at 353. 
Randle and Carrier have no application here. They address a trial court's grant of 
peremptory challenges under the rules of civil procedure, rather than a trial court's for-cause 
removal of prospective jurors in a criminal trial. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1331-32; Carrier, 
944 P.2d at 349-50. Defendant argues that the Randle-Carrier rationale should nonetheless 
apply because the alleged for-cause removals had the effect of giving the State additional 
peremptory challenges. Aplt. Brf. at 57. Such an approach flies in the face of this Court's 
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directive that judges should "err on the side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges." 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 51. 
Even under the Randle-Carrier rationale, prejudice is only presumed "when one side 
is erroneously given substantially more peremptory challenges than the other." Carrier, 944 
P.2d at 354 (emphasis added); accordRandle, 862 P.2d at 1334. In both Randle and Carrier, 
this Court concluded the trial court erroneously granted the defendants a three-to-one edge 
over the plaintiff in peremptory challenges, rather than a two-to-one edge as permitted under 
the "substantial controversy" test. Randle, 862 P.2d at 1333-34; Carrier, 944 P.2d at 353. 
In contrast, even if the Court were to consider the two for-cause removals here as peremptory 
challenges, that would result in seven total challenges for the prosecution and seven for 
defendants. See R. 354-56; R. 373:275. The prosecution, therefore, enjoyed no advantage, 
let alone a substantial advantage. 
In sum, adoption of defendant's automatic reversal rule would be counterproductive 
to the policy of encouraging removal when doubt exists. Knowing that any improvident 
removal of a prospective juror would automatically result in reversal, but that failure to 
remove a biased juror would result in reversal only upon a showing of actual prejudice, trial 
courts would have a greater incentive to include questionable jurors instead of removing 
them. This Court should therefore reject defendant's invitation to adopt such a rule. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF THE TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS DID NOT 
VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Finally, defendant argues that in erroneously removing the two jurors, the trial court 
favored the State by effectively giving it two additional peremptory challenges. Aplt. Brf. 
at 52-53. He contends that this violated his rights to due process, equal protection, and the 
uniform operation of the laws under the federal and state constitutions. Aplt. Brf. at 52-59. 
Defendant's argument is without merit. 
Even if one were to accept defendant's theory that an erroneous for-cause challenge 
was tantamount to an additional peremptory challenge for the State, his claim fails because 
this Court has held that "the forced use of a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's 
erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge does not violate the Constitution." State v. 
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 444 (Utah 1996). The same must hold true for an erroneous 
removal. This is because "peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of 
an impartial jury and a fair trial." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 
2358 (1992); accord Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 444. Therefore, the erroneous removal of a juror 
for cause does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT THE STATE'S WITNESS SUBMIT TO 
A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION 
In his second claim on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a psychiatric evaluation of Misty Ernst, a key witness for the State. Aplt. Brf. 
at 59-82.9 Defendant argues that Misty's competency was sufficiently drawn into question, 
thus warranting a mental evaluation, because she exhibited signs of mental illness, including 
so-called "hallucinations" about the victim after the murder. See Aplt. Brf. at 70-78. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. STANDARD FOR ORDERING MENTAL EVALUATIONS. 
In State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929,930 (Utah 1979), this Court acknowledged the trial 
court's authority to order a psychological examination of a witness in a criminal case. 
Courts, however, traditionally have been "reluctant to open the door to sanity [examinations] 
for witnesses" in criminal trials. United States v. Bloome, 773 F.Supp. 545, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991); see also Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.) (noting the "federal courts 
reluctance to encumber criminal proceedings with psychiatric examinations of witnesses"), 
cert denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 142 (1986); State v. Morant, 701 A.2d 1, 11 (Conn. 
1997) (holding that "the discretion to order a[ ] [psychiatric] examination should be exercised 
sparingly"); cf. State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. 1982) (holding that trial judge "has 
neither statutory authority nor discretionary power to compel an unwilling witness to a 
9The Order Denying Psychiatric Evaluation is reproduced in Addendum C. 
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psychiatric examination"). Utah appellate courts have yet to find a trial court's refusal to 
order an examination improper. See, e.g., Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 631 (upholding the trial 
judge's refusal to order a mental examination); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1196-98 
(Utah 1984) (same); State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Utah App. 1990) (same). 
"[OJrdering a witness to undergo a psychological examination is a drastic measure." 
United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750,755 (8th Cir.) (internal quotes omitted), cert, denied, 
516 U.S. 980,116 S.Ct. 487 (1995). This Court long ago recognized that "[t]he question of 
a person's sanity nearly always involves considerable delicacy." Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 
378, 381,431 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1967) (addressing a mental examination of a witness in 
a civil case under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). In that regard, the Court noted: 
If mere allegations . . . compelled the court to require a party to submit to a 
psychiatric examination, a way would be opened for opposing parties to 
harass, annoy or intimidate each other. The potential for mischief in such a 
situation is obvious and the court would always be well advised in exercising 
caution and restraint in regard to such a request 
Id. 
Ordering the psychological evaluation of a witness to a crime—whose involvement 
is not by choice—implicates "serious privacy interests." People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 
369, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 602 (Cal. 2001). Moreover, the injudicious exercise of that 
authority may discourage witnesses, who are often victims, from coming forward. See id. 
These concerns are compounded by "the many 'dangers' of using psychiatric evidence to 
impeach credibility," including the risk that jurors will consider irrelevant evidence or place 
too much reliance on the psychiatrist's findings, thereby abandoning their role as the ultimate 
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fact finders. Id. These same concerns may also be "pertinent to a court determination of 
competence." Id. Finally, ordering such examinations may produce a trial within a trial, 
diverting the jury's attention from the defendant's guilt or innocence to tangential issues of 
a witness's psyche that are not appropriate for jury consideration. 
Against this backdrop, the Court in Hubbard held that a trial court "might" grant such 
a request before permitting a witness to testify if the defendant establishes the existence of 
"a substantial doubt that [the] witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty 
to tell the truth, or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with 
reasonable accuracy." Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added); accordLairby, 699 P.2d 
at 1197 (citing Hubbard and applying same standard).10 
1. Incompetency Is the Touchstone of a Mental Examination. 
Under the Hubbard test, therefore, a showing that the witness cannot be believed is 
not sufficient. Ordinarily, a witness's credibility can be effectively attacked by pointing out 
conditions or circumstances that may have affected the witness's ability to accurately 
perceive or remember events, by exploiting discrepancies in prior statements and testimony, 
or by introducing reputation testimony or bad acts evidence indicative of dishonesty. When 
a witness's credibility is susceptible to attack in this way, as it usually is, a mental 
10Defendant relies on the court of appeals decision in Braun, 787 P.2d at 1343, for 
the proposition that rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes trial courts in a 
criminal case to order that a witness submit to a mental examination. Aplt. Brf. at 66 & 
n.45. This Court has never applied that rule in a criminal case and its applicability in the 
criminal setting is questionable since a witness for the State is not "a party or [ ] a person 
in the custody or under the legal control of a party." Utah R. Civ. P. 35(a). 
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examination of the witness should never be appropriate. See State v. Brown, 69»4 P.2d 587, 
590 (Utah 1984) (holding that "questions of credibility and choices between differing 
versions of the facts belong properly to the jury"); State v. Shabata, 687 P.2d 785,790 (Utah 
1984) (implicitly approving instruction advising the jurors that they are the sole judges of the 
facts and have the "responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the value 
of their testimony'). 
Instead, the defendant must make a showing that the witness's very competence is in 
doubt—that a question exists as to his or her ability to tell the truth or to perceive, remember, 
and relate events with reasonable accuracy. Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930. Utah law provides 
that save for a few exceptions, all persons "who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, 
perceiving, can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-24-1 (1996); accordUtoh Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1996); Utah R. Evid. 601.11 Absent 
some evidence of mental illness or similar incapacity, a showing that a person is not 
competent as a witness is improbable. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,1217 n. 13 (Utah 
1987) (remarking that "[a] witness wholly without capacity is difficult to imagine"), cert, 
denied, 484 U.S. 1044,108 S.Ct. 777 (1988); see also Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1198 (concluding 
defendant "did not raise a substantial doubt as to [the child victim's] suffering a mental 
aberration affecting her veracity"); Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930 (rejecting defendant's claim 
11
 Rules 605 and 606 make the trial judge and jurors in a trial incompetent to testify 
in that trial. Utah R. Evid. 605 & 606. 
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trial court should have ordered a mental exam based on his history of drug abuse and crimes 
of dishonesty), 
2. A "Substantial Doubt" as to Competency Must Be Shown. 
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court cited State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,979 
P.2d 799, as the most recent pronouncement of a defendant's right to relevant evidence of 
a witness's mental condition. R. 62. Defendant correctly points out that the issue in Bakalov 
was different than the issue before the trial court in this case. See Aplt. Brf. at 63. Here, as 
in Hubbard, the question is whether the court should order a witness with no history of 
mental illness to submit to a mental examination. In Bakalov, the issue was whether the 
prosecutor violated the defendant's due process right to material, exculpatory evidence by 
failing to disclose already existing mental health records indicating the rape victim suffered 
from a mental illness. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at 1fl| 28-30. 
Although the issues are different, Bakalov is instructive. The Bakalov court observed 
that "[ejvidence showing a witness's inability to accurately perceive, recall, or relate events 
at issue in a trial may be crucial to establishing the truth." Id. at f 32. Bakalov concluded 
that the "[nondisclosure of evidence [of mental illness] that reasonably casts doubt on a 
witness's veracity and ability to perceive and recall accurately when the prosecution rests 
much of its case on that witness's testimony may result in [reversible error]." Id (emphasis 
added). Although the prosecutor in Bakalov did not disclose to defendant the therapist's 
opinion that the rape victim suffered from a mental illness, the Court did not find it reversible 
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error because the mental illness "was not probative of [the victim's] ability to perceive, 
recall, and relate accurately the events of the rape." Id. 
Bakalov thus affirms the underlying premise in Hubbard that evidence of a witness's 
mental condition is only relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the witness's competency to 
testify. A comparison of the two cases also reveals that the burden for obtaining relevant 
evidence of a mental illness is different depending on what is sought. It is one thing to 
require the production of already existing evidence of a witness's mental condition. It is 
quite another matter to require a witness to submit to a mental examination to generate that 
evidence. Thus, where records of a mental illness already exist, the prosecutor who is aware 
of these records must disclose the evidence if it "reasonably cast[s] doubt" on the witness's 
competency to testify. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at J 32. On the other hand, where, as here, no 
such records exist, the court may not compel a mental examination to generate such evidence 
unless the facts cast a "substantial doubt" on the witness's competency to testify. Hubbard, 
601 P.2d at 930. Accordingly, the burden for obtaining an order requiring a witness to 
submit to a mental evaluation is much greater. 
3. Ordering a Mental Examination Is Discretionary. 
Even when a defendant establishes a substantial doubt as to a witness's competency, 
the trial court is not compelled to order the evaluation. Hubbard, 930 P.2d at 930 (holding 
that the trial court "might" order a mental examination if a substantial doubt exists as to 
competency). The determination to order an examination "rest[s] largely within the 
discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 930; accord Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1197. This discretion 
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lies not so much in the trial court's advantaged position in weighing witness credibility, as 
defendant suggests, see Aplt. Brf. at 62-67, but rather in a reluctance to unnecessarily intrude 
into the lives of witnesses. See Stone, 19 Utah 2d at 381, 431 P.2d at 804 (holding that 
because the issue of a person's sanity involves considerable delicacy, "the court would 
always be well advised in exercising caution and restraint" before granting such a request for 
a mental examination). Accordingly, a trial court's determination to order a mental 
evaluation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of its discretion. Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930; 
accord Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1197. 
B. A SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT DID NOT EXIST ABOUT MISTY ERNST'S ABILITY TO 
PERCEIVE, REMEMBER, AND RELATE EVENTS WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY. 
The trial court found no evidence that Misty suffered from a mental illness, either 
before or after the murder. R. 63. To the contrary, the court found that Misty was able to 
distinguish reality from fiction. R. 63. Defendant complains that whether Misty suffered 
from a mental illness was not the issue before the court. Aplt. Brf. at 62-67. However, 
because he alleged in his motion that Misty suffered from a mental illness, claiming she was 
"emotionally unstable" and she "hallucinates," he brought that issue squarely before the 
court. JCR. 58-59; see also JCR 69-70. Moreover, as stated above, defendant must show 
much more than a predilection to lie. He must show that Misty's very ability to perceive, 
remember, and relate events with reasonable accuracy was in substantial doubt. See 
Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930. As stated, absent some evidence of mental illness, such a 
showing is difficult to imagine. 
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1. No Evidence Suggested Misty Ernst Suffered from a Mental Illness 
Before or at the Time of the Murder Which Would Affect Her Ability 
to Perceive and Remember the Events of That Night. 
No evidence was introduced indicating that Misty had been treated or otherwise 
diagnosed with a mental illness before the murder. SeeR.36S: 1-186. Defendant argues that 
the following alleged facts support his claim that Misty suffered from "questionable mental 
health" before the crime: (1) Misty, as an adult, initiated a sexual relationship with Jordan, 
a minor; (2) Misty placed her drug use over her child; (3) Misty placed her relationship with 
Jordan over her child; and (4) Misty was addicted to marijuana and methamphetamine. Aplt. 
Brf. at 72. This argument was not raised below and is therefore waived. See Crooks ton v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789,800-01 (Utah 1991) (holding argument not raised in trial 
court was waived on appeal). 
In any event, poor judgment alone does not prove a mental illness, nor does it raise 
a substantial doubt as to the witness's ability to perceive, remember, or relate events with 
reasonable accuracy. See State v. Billingsley, 736 P.2d 611,613 (Ore. App. 1987) (holding 
poor judgment does not establish a mental illness); Bundy v. Dugger, 675 F.Supp. 622, 627 
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (same), ajfd, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988). Likewise, this Court has 
rejected the claim that drug abuse warrants a mental examination. See Hubbard, 601 P.2d 
at 930 (rejecting claim that trial court should have ordered mental examination based on 
witness's history of drug abuse and crimes of dishonesty). Moreover, while Misty may have 
had one or two beers earlier that day at the picnic, nothing suggested she was high on either 
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alcohol or drugs that night. See R. 374: 107-08. Indeed, she was the only one of the four 
who did not smoke a joint on Ucolo Road. R. 374: 39. 
In sum, no evidence was introduced creating a doubt, much less a substantial doubt, 
that Misty was unable to perceive the events of that night. 
2. No Evidence Suggested Misty Ernst Suffered from a Mental Illness 
after the Murder Which Would Affect Her Ability to Remember and 
Relate the Events of That Night 
(a) "Hallucinations" 
As observed by the trial court, "the only hint of mental illness [after the murder] is the 
adoption by [Misty] of defense counsel's characterization of her dreams as hallucinations." 
R. 63. Defendant did not introduce any evidence indicating that Misty had been treated or 
otherwise diagnosed with a mental illness after the murder. See R. 368: 1-186. He instead 
points to Misty's so-called "hallucinations" of the victim after the murder as evidence that 
Misty presently suffered from a mental illness that affected her ability to remember and relate 
the events of that evening. That Misty suffered from hallucinations in any medically 
significant way is nothing more than the unqualified speculation of defendant. 
To support his contention that Misty suffered from hallucinations, defendant relies on 
Misty's testimony during cross-examination at the preliminary hearing: 
Counsel . . . [Y]ou told [police] things that you knew because you heard 
in Dove Creek and not because you'd observed it personally, 
yes? 
Misty Ernst Yeah. Well, a lot of it too was just what was in my head. I 
mean, I guess somebody has to go through it to know because I 
saw lots of stuff after he was already gone. 
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Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
Counsel 
Misty Ernst 
What kind of stuff did you see, Misty? 
I saw James. I mean, I saw James every night. 
What do you mean when you say you saw him? You dreamt 
about it— 
*Yeah. 
he came back to see you? 
He came back to see me and was telling me— 
Do you recognize now that these things were hallucinations? 
Yeah. 
When you had these hallucinations, you thought they were true? 
Yes. 
Have you had some hallucinations about being there at the 
scene— 
Yeah. 
Where James was shot? 
Uh-huh. 
And when you talked to the police officers, did you tell them 
things that were part of your hallucinations? 
Well, I was telling them my halluc—whatever— 
Hallucinations? 
Yeah. 
Did you tell them that? 
No, because I thought that was what was happening until I got 
in jail. 
R. 368: 59-60 (emphasis added). The trial court correctly observed that Misty did not 
describe her experiences as hallucinations, but adopted defense counsel's characterization 
of them as such. R. 63. In fact, when counsel asked if what she told police included her 
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"hallucinations," Misty balked at that characterization: "Well, I was telling them my 
halluc—whatever—." R. 368: 60. Misty also adopted defense counsel's initial 
characterization of these images as dreams, and she never said anything to discourage that 
characterization. See R. 368: 59-60. 
Described in her own terms, Misty explained that "a lot of [what she told police] too 
was just what was in [her] head." R. 368: 59. She said the victim came back to her every 
night and that she saw him at the scene. R. 368: 59-60. Reference to their occurrence at 
night supports their characterization as dreams, or perhaps more aptly, nightmares. These 
experiences also could be characterized as the inevitable images and thoughts conjured up 
in Misty's mind from reliving and imagining the events of that evening. Defendant did not 
introduce any expert testimony explaining what hallucinations are, the possibility that 
someone like Misty could be suffering from them, or the effect they might have on a person's 
ability to remember and relate events. Defendant's claim thus falls short. 
Defendant attempts to make up for that deficiency by citing to, and including in his 
addendum, excerpts from the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1995) ("DSM-IV") and to the Drug Enforcement 
Agency's website on marijuana and methamphetamine abuse. Aplt. Brf. at 72-73 & 
Addendum, Tab 3 (pp. 33-53). None of these authorities were presented to the trial court. 
Nevertheless, relying on that evidence, defendant speculates that Misty's so-called 
hallucinations could be symptomatic of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, psychoses, drug-
related schizophrenia, or other chronic drug abuse. Aplt. Brf. at 72-73. 
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The law is well-settled that "[a]n appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the 
evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f7,974 P.2d 279 
{quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)) (ellipsis 
in original); accord In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 862 (Utah 1996) (noting that "reviewing 
court[s] will not take new evidence"). As such, "an appellant's addendum may not consist 
of evidence that is outside the record on appeal." Pliego, 1999 UT 8, at f 7. This Coun 
should "therefore strike this extraneous evidence and [should] not consider it for purposes 
of this appeal." Id. 
Moreover, defendant uses the DSM-IV as if the diagnosis of a mental illness was as 
simple as matching a few symptoms with the corresponding disorder. Use of the DMS-IV 
in that manner is wholly contrary to the parameters placed on its use by the American 
Psychiatric Association. The manual expressly provides that its use should be limited to 
those with the appropriate training and experience in diagnosing and treating mental illness: 
The diagnostic categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are meant to be 
employed by individuals with appropriate clinical training and experience in 
diagnosis. It is important that DSM-IV not be applied mechanically by 
untrained individuals. The specific diagnostic criteria included in DSM-IV are 
meant to serve as guidelines to be informed by clinical judgment and are not 
meant to be used in cookbook fashion. 
DSM-IV, at xxiii. Defendant uses the manual in just that fashion and invites the Court to do 
the same. This Court should decline the invitation. 
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(b) Varied Accounts 
Defendant argues that Misty's differing accounts of the murder support his claim that 
her so-called hallucinations or drug abuse compromised her ability to perceive, remember, 
and relate events with reasonable accuracy. See Aplt. Brf. at 73-77 & nn.51-52. However, 
a review of Misty's varied accounts of the murder does not reveal an inability to distinguish 
reality from fantasy. 
Initial Questioning by Sheriff Martin. Not surprisingly, Misty told Sheriff Martin 
that she knew nothing about Eaton's whereabouts when she was questioned the day after the 
murder. R. 368: 58-59. Misty had a genuine fear that she would be put to death if she was 
linked to his murder. R. 368: 102. She was also Jordan's girlfriend and wished to protect 
him. R. 368: 13,101. Thus, when Sheriff Martin initially questioned her, she told him that 
Eaton had come to her house the night before, borrowed her car to visit a friend, and after 
returning the car, left on foot. R. 368: 65. She said that it was the last time she saw him and 
that no one else was present. R. 368: 65. 
April 27th Interviews. During the next few weeks, Misty was haunted by the murder 
of her friend. As noted above, she imagined seeing him at night, there at the scene and 
talking to her. R. 368: 59-60. During that time, she remained close to Jordan, often crying 
to him that she "[could not] keep it inside anymore." R. 368: 27-28. Finally, on April 27th, 
some three weeks after the murder, she gave police an account of the events that evening in 
two separate, but consistent interviews. R. 368: 116-18,129, 138. 
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She explained that when Eaton returned her car, he did not leave on foot, but 
accompanied her, Jordan, and Terril to Monticello to obtain drugs. R. 368:112. On the way 
to Monticello, the friends decided to smoke marijuana, but one of the two brothers asked 
Misty to not let them smoke in the car because her mother would be using it the next day. 
R. 368: 112. This, she explained, was the first clue she had that they planned to hurt Eaton 
in some way. R. 368: 112. However, Misty said she did not know the brothers had brought 
guns with them and she denied any knowledge they intended to kill Eaton. R. 368: 114-15, 
133, 135. 
She said that after turning onto Ucolo Road, she parked and the three men walked into 
a grove of trees to smoke a joint of marijuana. R. 368: 113. She remained behind to finish 
a cigarette. R. 368: 113. She thereafter heard a single gunshot, followed by a pause, and 
then a round of "15 or more" gunshots. R. 368: 113. During the volley of gunshots, she 
described hearing Eaton cry and scream, asking, "Why are you guys killing me? What have 
I done to you?" R. 368: 113. She then described hearing another solitary shot followed by 
quiet. R. 368: 113. She explained that when Jordan and Terril returned to the car, Terril cut 
his hand on the barbed wire fence separating the car from the grove of trees. R. 368: 114. 
When they returned to the car without Eaton, Misty asked if Eaton was still alive. R. 368: 
113-14. She told police that Terril responded in the negative, saying he had "shot him in the 
head." R. 368: 114. She did not see the brothers carrying any guns. R. 368: 126-27. 
Misty told police that after returning to Dove Creek, she and Jordan went to Cortez. 
R. 368: 114-15. She explained that when she and Jordan returned to the Calliham home in 
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Dove Creek later that night, she saw the two handguns along with Eaton's coat. R. 368:114-
15. She said that at least one of the brothers cleaned the blood off the guns. R. 368: 115, 
130. Finally, Misty explained that she believed defendants killed Eaton because they thought 
he had stolen some drugs from them. R. 368: 112. 
Preliminary Hearing Testimony. After reaching a plea agreement with the 
prosecutor, Misty testified at defendants' preliminary hearing. R. 368: 6-10. In her morning 
testimony, Misty gave essentially the same account, but equivocated as to four significant 
details. First, she denied any awareness that defendants harbored any ulterior motive when 
they insisted on not smoking in the car. R. 368: 35,40,44,47-48. She claimed instead that 
the only thing she thought was going to happen was that "[t]hey were going to smoke a 
joint." R. 368: 35. Second, she claimed that neither Jordan, nor defendant responded when 
she asked if Eaton was dead. R. 368: 24-25. On further inquiry, she recalled telling police 
that defendant said he shot Eaton in the head, but she refused "to say Terril said something 
or Jordan said something," explaining that she "[did]n't know which one" because she "was 
in shock." R. 368: 25. Third, she claimed that she only saw one gun afterwards at the 
Calliham house, rather than two. R. 368: 30, 34. Finally, she testified that she knew of no 
motive for either brother to kill or hurt Eaton. R. 368: 40-41. 
After a short recess midway through her cross-examination by defendant's counsel, 
Misty's attorney represented to the court that Misty "only gave partial answers to the 
questions, and she'd like an opportunity to clarify what her answers really are to questions 
that [the prosecutor] asked." R. 368: 49-50. Misty subsequently acknowledged that when 
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Jordan whispered to not let them smoke in her car, she knew "they were going to scare 
[Eaton] in some way." R. 368: 50-51. She further explained that she stayed behind when 
the three men left to smoke behind the trees because she did not want to be present "if they 
were going to beat him up or whatever." R. 368: 50-51. She also reaffirmed that the motive 
behind the brothers' actions was that Eaton "had stolen some stuff from Jordan." R. 368:78-
79. 
When the court recessed for lunch, Misty reviewed her audio taped interview on the 
27th of April. Prelim. 81-82. On re-direct examination, Misty reaffirmed her belief that 
when she was told not to let Eaton smoke in the car, the brothers intended to beat up Eaton 
for stealing methamphetamine from Jordan. R. 368:83-85. She also reaffirmed that she had 
seen both guns at the Calliham residence after the murder. R. 368: 87-89. She again 
affirmed that one of the two brothers said that he had "finished [Eaton] in the head," but 
indicated she did not know which of the two said it. R. 368: 87, 98. She maintained that 
when she told police that it was defendant who made the statement, she also told them that 
she was not certain. R. 368: 100. 
* * * 
Contrary to defendant's claim, Misty's varied accounts of the events surrounding the 
murder did not create a substantial doubt about her ability to "distinguish [ ] reality from her 
hallucinations or her dreams or her statements to the police." See Aplt. Brf. at 76. In fact, 
except for a few differences, the accounts were consistent. Defendant makes much of the 
fact that Misty admitted that part of what she told police was from her so-called 
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hallucinations and what she had heard from others. See R. 368: 57 (admitting that some of 
what she told police was what she heard in Dove Creek), 59 (admitting that she told police 
things that were "just what was in [her] head"), 61 (same). However, when pressed on that 
issue, she simply testified that her representation that defendant had said he shot Eaton in the 
head was untrue. R. 368: 63. When asked "[w]hat other things [she told] the officers that 
weren't true," Misty testified, "That was just my one thing that was bothering me the most." 
R. 368: 63. 
An examination of her accounts reveals that any differences were nothing more than 
an attempt to deceive the court, rather than an inability to distinguish fact from fiction. Her 
initial divergence from her account to police appeared to stem in part from her desire to 
protect Jordan. See R. 368: 101. It is also explained by an apparent fear of what defendants 
might do to her. See R. 368: 89-90. She testified that she "didn't want to say the truth about 
what happened" because she "didn't want Jordan to be mad at [her]." R. 368: 89. Misty also 
explained that even though she made a deal with the prosecutor, she changed her mind once 
she saw defendant and Jordan in the courtroom. R. 368: 89-91. Her expressed fear was 
eminently reasonable given the fact her boyfriend had willfully murdered their friend. See 
R. 368: 13-14. 
Moreover, it was apparent in her initial morning testimony that she was being less 
than forthright in her answers. For example, when the prosecutor challenged her testimony 
that she simply thought they were going to smoke a joint when they turned onto Ucolo Road, 
Misty's responses were less than convincing: 
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Prosecutor Do you remember when you turned off on the Ucolo Road, did 
you have a feeling that something was going to happen? 
Misty Ernst Not that. I mean, I don't—I can't say—yeah, something was 
going to happen, but not that. They could have—I can't say it 
because I— 
Prosecutor You told [Deputy] Kimball that you knew something was going 
to happen. Do you remember that? 
Misty Ernst Yeah, I do remember telling him that. 
Prosecutor What were you thinking about when you said that? What did 
you think was going to happen? 
Misty Ernst They were going to smoke a joint, and — 
Prosecutor Did you think there was going to be some harm to James? 
Misty Ernst No. 
R. 368: 35. Although she eventually stood by her initial testimony, she obviously struggled 
getting there. 
Likewise, she was never able to fully deny that one of the Calliham brothers told her 
he had finished Eaton off in the head. She initially said that neither brother responded to her 
question as to whether Eaton was dead. R. 368: 24. When the prosecutor challenged her 
testimony, she equivocated: 
I can't say I remember that. I mean I remember telling the officer whatever, 
but, I mean, that was three weeks before. I mean, I guess—I don't know. I 
don't know which one. I mean, I was in shock. I didn't— 
R. 368: 25. Thus, she ultimately did not deny that the statement was made, but only hedged 
on who made the statement. In fact, she later testified that although she told police that 
defendant made the statement, she also told them she was not certain. R. 368: 100. 
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Defendant also contends that her testimony at the preliminary hearing was the product 
of her review of the audiotape, rather than of her independent memory. Aplt. Brf. at 77 & 
n.54. However, she did not review the audiotape until the lunch recess. See R. 368: 81-82. 
When testimony resumed, Misty added only two facts of any arguable significance that she 
included in her police interviews, but failed to mention earlier in the preliminary hearing. 
First, she added that she heard a solitary gunshot following the volley of shots, R. 368: 86, 
but that detail merely corroborated her prior testimony that one of the brothers said he 
finished Eaton off in the head. Second, she added that Jordan showed her the second gun. 
R. 368: 87-89. Other than those two details, her testimony after reviewing the audiotape was 
not materially different. 
(c) Corroboration 
Significantly, Misty's account of the events surrounding the murder was strongly 
corroborated by other evidence discovered by police. Police recovered 219 mm shell casings 
at the scene, R. 368: 123,138,146-47, corroborating Misty's account that she heard "15 or 
more" gunshots, R. 368:113. The State Crime Lab verified that two weapons were used, R. 
368: 139, verifying both brothers' participation, R. 368: 113-15. The Crime Lab also 
identified one of the guns as a Smith & Wesson Sigma, which was the same kind of gun 
stolen in a St. George robbery to which defendant admitted. R. 368: 139-40. Eaton's body 
was found in a grove of trees near a barbed wire fence, R. 368: 138, 146, just as Misty 
described, R. 368: 112-13. Eaton was also found without a coat, corroborating information 
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that he had been seen with it earlier and Misty's account that defendant had taken it from 
him. R. 368: 28, 114-15, 138, 147. 
Finally, police confirmed that Misty and Jordan visited Michael Gentry late that 
evening. R. 368: 141-43. Gentry told police that Jordan discussed a problem he had with 
someone in Dove Creek who owed him money for drugs. R. 368:141-43. Gentry told police 
that Jordan said he had taken care of the problem, while mimicking with his hand the act of 
pulling the trigger on a gun. R. 368: 141-43. Gentry also told police that Jordan had 
instructed him to be sure to tell police they were there at his house that night. R. 368: 143. 
All of these additional facts, withheld from the public, see R. 375: 16-18,21-22, 95-
96,102-03, spoke to the reliability of Misty's account and her ability to accurately remember 
and relate the events of that night. Moreover, the defense had every opportunity to attack 
Misty's credibility and they took advantage of that opportunity. They exploited the 
discrepancies in Misty's accounts of the murder. R. 376: 52-53, 57-58, 60. They also 
introduced testimony that Misty had a reputation in the community for being dishonest. R. 
375: 143, 150, 158-59, 164, 200-01. A psychological examination would have offered no 
more. 
C. DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
Defendant also contends that his right to confront witnesses under the federal and state 
constitutions was violated because he was not permitted "to fully explore and explain the 
unique functioning of Misty's mental processes." Aplt. Brf. at 80-81 & n.57. He further 
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argues that because the alleged error resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights, the 
State must establish the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Brf. at 81 -82. 
Because defendant did not raise these constitutional claims below, this Court should not 
address them now on appeal. 
The law is well-settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citations omitted). This 
"preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a 
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." 
Id {citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). Defendant has argued neither plain error, nor exceptional 
circumstances. Accordingly, this Court will not address defendant's constitutional claims 
for the first time on appeal. See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 
1129 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
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III. 
ADMISSION OF JORDAN'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS, 
REDACTED TO OMIT ANY REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT, DID 
NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S CONFRONTATION RIGHTS 
A. DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIALS. 
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in admitting the redacted admissions 
of his brother Jordan, rather than severing the brothers' trials. Aplt. Brf. at 82-95. Because 
defendant abandoned his motion for severance, he waived that claim on appeal. 
In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to sever his trial from that of his brother Jordan 
on the ground the prosecution intended to introduce certain out-of-court statements made by 
Jordan "injurious to [defendant's] defense" and which allegedly could not be "cured by 
redaction." R. 133.12 Although the motion represented that a supporting memorandum 
would be forthcoming, none was filed and no ruling from the court appears on the record. 
See R. 133. A review of the record reveals that no ruling was issued because defendant did 
not pursue his severance motion, but instead agreed to the admission of Jordan's statements, 
redacted to omit all reference to defendant. 
The disposition of defendant's motion for severance was disclosed in the course of 
a ruling at trial on a motion for mistrial made by defendant's counsel. In denying the mistrial 
motion, the trial court observed: 
12A previous motion to sever was also filed, alleging that the brothers' defenses 
were irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. R. 34-39. Finding that defendant did not 
show that their defenses were mutually exclusive, the trial court denied the motion. R. 
49-50. Defendant has not appealed that ruling. 
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The resolution we reached this morning, before we started the trial, is that the 
witnesses who had listened to those admissions by Jordan Calliham would say 
instead of we, they would say "I". And that was a resolution acceptable to 
[defendant's counsel], proposed by [the prosecutor], to which [Jordan's 
counsel] raised some objection 
R. 374: 116 (emphasis added). Defendant's counsel confirmed that agreement as he 
discussed its scope: 
Defense Your Honor, if I can just correct what my understanding of our 
Counsel discussion in chambers was, we didn't exclude Misty from those 
people— 
Court We never even discussed her. 
Defense We just talked about people who would testify about certain 
Counsel statements implicating Jordan—Terril Calliham. 
R. 374: 118. Therefore, defendant agreed to the admission of Jordan's out-of-court 
statements in a redacted form that omitted any reference to defendant. 
Because defendant did not pursue his severance motion, agreeing instead to the 
admission of Jordan's redacted out-of-court statements, he affirmatively waived any right to 
challenge on appeal the propriety of his joint trial with Jordan. See State v. Johnson, 856 
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[a] defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's 
ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an appellate court"). This Court should 
not, therefore, address that claim on appeal. 
The Court also will not address an unpreserved issue on appeal if a strategic reason 
existed for counsel's failure to pursue the claim at trial. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
343 (Utah 1997). As observed by the trial court, admission of the redacted statements 
appears to have benefitted defendant because they provided a contrast in the strength of the 
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evidence against each brother and even implied that only Jordan and Misty were present 
when Eaton was murdered. See R. 376:13-14. Although counsel was not permitted to argue 
that implication to the jury, see R. 376: 13, the inference is apparent. It is reasonable to 
assume that counsel agreed to the admission of the redacted statements for those reasons. 
Having thus made a conscious, reasonable decision not to pursue his motion for severance, 
he cannot now claim error on appeal. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
Defendant also challenges, on the same ground, the trial court's denial of his motions 
for a mistrial. See Aplt. Brf. at 85-865 89. As explained above, however, defendant agreed 
to the admission of Jordan's redacted statements and therefore waived any challenge to them. 
In any event, the redacted statements comported with established Supreme Court precedent 
and any incidental testimony by Misty worked no prejudice to defendant. 
1. Procedural Background. 
On direct examination, Misty Ernst testified that when Jordan returned to the car after 
speaking with Michael Gentry, he told her that he had told Gentry "what him and Terril had 
done." R. 374: 50. Because Jordan's statement was not redacted to refer only to Jordan, 
defendant moved for a mistrial. R. 374:113-14. The trial court denied the motion, finding 
that its order requiring redaction of Jordan's statements did not contemplate statements made 
to Misty. R. 374: 116. The court further found that Misty's testimony was not prejudicial 
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to defendant because the case rested on the credibility of her testimony anyway. R. 374:116-
17. 
At the close of all the evidence, the trial court asked defendant if he wished to move 
for a mistrial based on the admission of Jordan's redacted out-of-court statements. R. 375: 
213-15. After consulting with his attorney, defendant decided not to move for a mistrial. R. 
375: 213-15. However, the following day, just prior to the court's reading of the jury 
instructions, defendant reversed his decision from the day before and moved for a mistrial. 
R. 376:9-11. Defendant contended that a mistrial was warranted not only because of Misty's 
unredacted testimony, but also because of the admission of Jordan's redacted statements to 
his cellmates. R. 376: 10. Defendant reasoned that these statements created a "spillover 
prejudicial effect" because the jury would "assume that if Jordan Calliham was involved in 
this and is admitting to it, then it's only natural that Misty's entire statement is true and that 
Terril Calliham was involved, too." R. 376: 10. The trial court denied defendant's mistrial 
motion, holding that admission of the redacted statements may have actually worked to 
defendant's benefit and did not otherwise prejudice him. R. 376: 13-14. 
2. Standard of Appellate Review. 
The overriding issue before a trial court on a motion for a mistrial is whether "'the 
conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 
20, 999 P.2d 7 {quoting State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 19, 975 P.2d 469)). The 
decision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not, 
therefore, be disturbed "'absent an abuse of that discretion.'" Id (quoting Kiriluk, 1999 UT 
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App 30, at f 19). "Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly 
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to 
have had a fair trial, [the Court] will not find that the [trial] court's decision was an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997); accord Kohl, 2000 UT 
35, at \ 20; State v. Telford, 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that the trial 
court's refusal to sever a trial requires reversal "only if a more favorable result for defendant 
would have been reasonably likely had the trial court severed the trial"). Whether testimony 
is admitted in violation of a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, % 12,999 P.2d 565 
(reviewing for correctness whether the judge should have returned the jury for further 
deliberation or declared a mistrial when juror equivocated during jury polling); State v. 
Gonzales, 989 P.2d 419, 423 (N.M. 1999) (holding that whether admission of hearsay 
evidence violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law). 
Where a mistrial motion rests on a violation of defendant's constitutional rights to confront 
the witnesses, the Court will reverse the conviction for any such error unless it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 
1728(1969). 
3. The Court Properly Admitted Jordan's Out-of-Court Statements to 
Cellmates. 
As explained above, because defendant agreed to the admission of the redacted 
statements, he waived any claim they were improperly admitted. Therefore, just as defendant 
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cannot rely on the admission of those statements as a basis for reversal of the trial court's 
ruling on the abandoned motion for severance, he cannot rely on their admission as a basis 
for reversal of the ruling on the mistrial motion. 
(a) Admission of Accomplice Confessions and the Bruton Exception. 
Even had defendant preserved his claim, the admission of Jordan's redacted 
statements to cellmates did not violate his constitutional right to confront the witnesses 
against him. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused 
the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
Obviously, the right to confront one's accusers includes the right to cross-examine them. 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,404,85 S.Ct. 1065,1068 (1965). Therefore, the prosecution 
may not introduce a hearsay statement against the accused unless the declarant is unavailable. 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980). Even then, the hearsay 
declaration will be admitted against the defendant only if it "falls within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception" or if it otherwise carries "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 
Id. While a defendant's own admissions "carry a distinguished heritage confirming their 
admissibility" under the Confrontation Clause, "an accomplice's [hearsay] statements that 
shift or spread the blame to [the] defendant" generally do not. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 
116, 127, 133-34, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1895, 1898-99 (1999). 
A defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is of particular concern 
when he is jointly tried with an accomplice whose confession, implicating both the 
accomplice and the defendant, is introduced against the accomplice. While the accomplice's 
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statement is admissible against him, it is not admissible against his co-defendant. 
"Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be 
a witness 'against5 a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against 
a co-defendant." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707 (1987); 
accord State v. Nield, 804 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah App. 1990). However, in Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), the Supreme Court carved out a "narrow 
exception" to that general principle. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 707. The 
high court concluded that in a joint trial, too great a risk exists that jurors will consider the 
accomplice's statement against the defendant even when clearly instructed to disregard it. 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-37,88 S.Ct at 1627-28. The Court thus held that the Confrontation 
Clause prohibited the admission of accomplice confessions inculpating the defendant. Id. 
at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628. 
The Bruton exception was reconsidered by the Supreme Court almost twenty years 
later in Richardson. In that case, the high court observed that whereas the accomplice 
confession admitted in Bruton '"expressly implicated]' the defendant as his accomplice," 
the confession admitted in Richardson was redacted to omit all reference to the defendant. 
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203,208,107 S.Ct. at 1705,1707 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124 
n. 1,88 S.Ct. at 1621 n. 1) (brackets in original). The Court found significant that the redacted 
confession in Richardson "was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked 
with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant's own testimony)." Id. at 208,107 S.Ct. 
at 1707. The Court concluded that "[wjhere the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is 
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a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the 
evidence." Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1708. Thus, "Richardson placed outside the scope of 
Bruton 's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially." Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 
185, 195, 118 S.Ct. at 1151, 1156(1998). 
Richardson's rationale in rejecting a rule that would require the prosecution to sever 
the trials of co-defendants if it wished to use their confessions in court is worth repeating. 
[Such a rule] is not as facile or as just a remedy as might seem. Joint trials 
play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for almost one-third 
of federal criminal trials in the past five years.. . . Joint trials generally serve 
the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more 
accurate assessment of relative culpability-advantages which sometimes 
operate to the defendant's benefit. Even apart from these tactical 
considerations, joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding 
the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts. The other way of assuring 
compliance with an expansive Bruton rule would be to forgo use of 
codefendant confessions. That price also is too high, since confessions "are 
more than merely * desirable'; they are essential to society's compelling interest 
in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." 
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic 
one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the 
belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests 
of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process. 
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209-211, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
The Court thus held "that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the 
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his 
or her existence." Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. 
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(b) Analysis. 
The court's admission of Jordan's redacted statements safely navigated outside 
Bruton 's exception, falling safely within the general rule that trials courts may assume the 
jury will follow limiting instructions not to consider an accomplice's confession against the 
defendant. The jury was clearly instructed that Jordan's out-of-court statements to the 
cellmates could be considered against him, but not against defendant. See R. 343.l3 
Defendant does not contend otherwise. Moreover, Jordan's admissions to the three cellmates 
were redacted to exclude all reference to defendant. R. 374:180-97. Contrary to defendant's 
claim, those redactions did not distort Jordan's statements—they simply omitted those 
portions which also inculpated defendant. See Aplt. Brf. at 93. 
In December 1999, Deputy Grayson Redd of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office 
took statements from three of Jordan's cellmates at the San Juan County Jail—Michael 
Mulvey, Richard Raso, and Adrian Killsinsight. See R. 374: 180-97.; R. 387-91.14 A 
comparison of the cellmates' interviews with their testimony at trial readily confirms that the 
redactions at trial complied with Richardson without distorting the substance of the 
confessions.15 
13Instruction No. 14 and Instruction No. 15 are reproduced in Addendum D. 
14The police reports summarizing the cellmates' interviews with Deputy Redd, 
made part of the record on appeal, are reproduced in Addendum E. 
15The transcript of the cellmates' testimony is reproduced in Addendum F. 
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Michael Mulvey. In a telephone interview, Michael Mulvey told Deputy Redd that 
while he was in jail, Jordan told him: (1) "he, his brother, and his girlfriend took the victim 
to a' country road;'" (2) "he, his brother, and his girlfriend were present when the victim was 
killed;" and (3) he wanted to take the rap so his brother could get off." R. 389 (emphasis 
added). At trial, Mulvey confirmed that Jordan had told him: (1) "he and his girlfriend took 
a victim to a country road;" and (2) "he and his girlfriend were present when the victim was 
killed." R. 374: 181 (emphasis added). The omission of all references to defendant did not 
distort the statement, but simply ensured that defendant was not also implicated. 
Richard Raso. Richard Raso, who had shared a cell with Jordan for two months, 
reported to Deputy Redd that Jordan told him: (1) "the killing was over money owed him for 
a l/4# marijuana," (2) "he, his brother, and his girlfriend took the victim on a road between 
Monticello and the Colorado state line and shot him 19 times," (3) "he and his brother took 
the victim while the girl stayed at the vehicle," (4) "the victim was his best friend but that he 
got what he deserved," (5) "one of the guns was a Smith and Wesson 9 mm Sigma," (6) 
"How can they find the gun when it was burned up," and (7) "after the shooting him and his 
brother split up and went in different directions." R. 390 (emphasis added). Raso also told 
Deputy Redd that Jordan explained how he had fired the gun, where he had shot the victim, 
and how the victim had 'Vibrated" while being shot. R. 390-91. In doing so, Raso mimicked 
the way Jordan had demonstrated these actions. R. 390-91. 
At trial, Raso confirmed Jordan told him that (1) "he, his girlfriend took the victim 
on a road between Monticello and the Colorado state line, shot him 19 times," (2) "while that 
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was occurring his girlfriend had stayed at the vehicle," (3) "the victim was his best friend, 
but that he got what he deserved," and (4) "How can they find the gun when it was burned 
up?" See R. 374:186-87 (emphasis added). Raso's testimony, therefore, as redacted to omit 
any reference to defendant, complied with Richardson 's mandate and in no way distorted the 
substance of his statement—it simply did not inculpate defendant as well. 
The prosecutor also asked Raso whether Jordan told him that he and his girlfriend had 
gone to Cortez after the shooting. R. 374: 187. Raso testified that "[h]e never said that," 
explaining that Jordan said that "they had split up." R. 374: 187. Although Raso had 
presumably reported to Deputy Redd that "him and his brother split up" after the shooting, 
R. 390, the clear import of Raso's testimony was that Jordan had said he and his girlfriend 
had split up after the shooting. Accordingly, no reference was made to defendant.16 
Even if Raso's testimony could be construed as indirectly referring to defendant, it 
would not violate Bruton. As recently held by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "where a 
defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun or phrase there is no Bruton violation, 
providing that the incrimination of the defendant is only by reference to evidence other than 
the redacted statement and a limiting instruction is given to the jury." United States v. 
16The prosecutor also explored Jordan's other statements to Raso, but those 
statements did not implicate defendant. SeeR. 374: 186-90. For example, Raso 
confirmed that Jordan had told him where the bullets were fired into Eaton's body and 
how his body moved "in a vibrating motion" when the bullets hit him. R. 374: 188-90. 
Raso showed the jury how Jordan had demonstrated these actions. R. 374: 188-89. On 
the other hand, Raso clarified some apparent inaccuracies in the police report. He 
testified that Jordan had only told him that he was accused of shooting Eaton over a 
marijuana debt, using a Smith & Wesson 9 mm Sigma, and firing the gun in a particular 
manner. R. 374: 186-88. 
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Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208,1214 (10th Cir. 1999). This is so because "'referring to 
joint activity by use of the pronouns "we" and "they," or by use of indefinite words such as 
"someone," does not draw attention to the redaction and thus, in most situations, will not be 
incriminating unless linked to a codefendant by other trial evidence.'" Id. (quoting United 
States v.Edwards, 159F.3d 1117,1126 (8th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 825,120S.Q. 
310 (1999)). There is no Bruton violation if, as here, reference to "they" implicates 
defendant only after consideration of additional evidence outside the statement itself. Id. at 
1214-15. 
Adrian Killsinsight Adrian Killsinsight reported to Deputy Redd that Jordan had told 
him: (1) "he had killed the victim;" (2) "they went into the woods and shot him up;" (3) "he 
shot [the victim] 10 times;"(4) "he 'capped him because his [sic] owed him $300 for coke;'" 
and (5) "they 'tortured him' [and] [tjhey 'shot him up." R. 387-88 (emphasis added). 
Killsinsight also indicated to Deputy Redd that Jordan demonstrated to him with his hand 
how he fired the gun as they shot Eaton. R. 387. At trial, Killsinsight confirmed that Jordan 
told him: (1) "he had killed the victim;" (2) "he had went into the woods and shot him up;" 
(3) "he capped him because he owed him $300 for coke;" and (4) "he had tortured him, [and] 
that he had shot him up." R. 374: 193-95. He also demonstrated for the jury the hand 
gestures made by Jordan when he explained to him how he shot Eaton. R. 374:194. As with 
the other cellmates, Killsinsight did not reference defendant at all, nor did it distort the 
substance of Jordan's statement. 
* * * 
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In sum, Jordan's redacted statements omitted all reference to defendant and thus 
complied with Richardson. Contrary to defendant's claim, they did not directly implicate 
defendant in the murder. Aplt. Brf. at 95. Counsel at trial recognized this fact, only 
complaining that the jury would "assume that if Jordan Calliham was involved in this and is 
admitting to it, then it's only natural that Misty's entire statement is true and that Terril 
Calliham was involved, too." R. 376: 10. In other words, the statements were only 
incriminating against defendant when "linked" with Misty's testimony. Richardson, 481 
U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707. Because Jordan's redacted statements to his cellmates 
"w[ere] not incriminating on [their] face, and became so only when linked with [other] 
evidence," the trial court below "could properly assume" that the jury, as instructed, did not 
use Jordan's admissions against defendant. Id. & n.3. 
4. Admission of Jordan's Unredacted Statement to Misty Ernst Did Not 
Prejudice Defendant 
Defendant further contends that the admission of Jordan's unredacted statement to 
Misty Ernst while they were in Cortez also violated his confrontration rights under Bruton. 
Aplt. Brf. at 85-86,94-95. That testimony was the basis for defendant's motion for mistrial 
during the prosecutor's direct examination of Misty. Specifically, defendant challenges the 
following highlighted testimony: 
Prosecutor . . . [W]hat happened, after you finished at Michael J's? 
Misty Ernst I asked Jordan what he told Michael J and he told MichaelJ 
what him and Terril had done. 
Prosecutor Is that what he told you? 
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Mistv Ernst Um-hm. He said that he hurt this guy-
R. 374:50 (emphasis added). Because Misty retreated from her original statement, indicating 
instead that Jordan "said that he hurt this guy," defendant was not implicated and no Bruton 
violation occurred. Reversal is not warranted in any event because any arguable error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Because a Bruton violation implicates a defendant's constitutional right to confront 
the witnesses, the State must show that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Harrington, 395 U.S. at 253-54, 89 S.Ct. at 1728. Whether an error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt "depends upon a host of factors," including: 
the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating 
or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of 
cross- examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of 
the prosecution's case. 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431,1438 (1986); accord State v. 
VillareaU 889 P.2d419,425-26 (Utah 1995). Consideration of those factors here reveals that 
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The relative importance of Misty's testimony that Jordan said he had told Gentry 
"what him and Terril had done" is determinative. The statement to Misty carried almost no 
importance, if any at all. The remark had meaning only in the context of Misty's other 
admissible testimony, in which she testified that both defendant and Jordan went into a grove 
of trees with Eaton and shot him. Thus, the jury could only determine what "Terril had done" 
based on Misty's other testimony. Moreover, as noted above, when the prosecutor asked 
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Misty to reaffirm that Jordan made such a statement, she retreated, indicating instead that 
Jordan "said that he hurt this guy." R. 374: 50. 
The other factors also demonstrate that any alleged error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Misty testified that defendant himself told her "that he had shot [Eaton] 
and he wasn't falling over," and he therefore "thought he was gonna have to kick him over." 
R. 374: 59. Accordingly, the statement was cumulative. Moreover, the statement in no way 
corroborated Misty's other testimony as would confessions to others, an important concern 
underlying the Bruton rule. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203-04,107 S.Ct. at 1705. Finally, 
as discussed supra, at 53, Misty's other testimony was corroborated by other evidence 
gathered by police, including the twenty-one 9 mm shell casings from two different guns 
found at the crime scene, the location of Eaton's body in a grove of trees adjacent to a barbed 
wire fence, Michael Gentry's statement, and Eaton's missing coat. The medical examiner's 
finding that at least nineteen bullets penetrated Eaton's body, including a single shot to the 
face fired at close range, also corroborated Misty's testimony. See R. 375: 75-80, 84. 
Because any alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court properly 
declined to grant a mistrial.17 
l7In a footnote, defendant argues that the Court should "reject the redaction method 
of dealing with Bruton issues" under his right to confrontation under article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 94 n. 66. Because he presents no separate argument 
or meaningful analysis under the state constitutional provision, this Court should not 
address his state constitutional claim. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 n. 6 (Utah 1993). 
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IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN READING 
PORTIONS OF MISTY ERNST'S TESTIMONY AT THE JURY'S 
REQUEST 
A. JURY REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT. 
During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge requesting the "testimony 
transcripts." R. 376: 83.l8 During a brief discussion outside the presence of the jury, the 
court clarified that the jury was seeking only a particular portion of the testimony. R. 376: 
84. Counsel for both defendants objected to providing the transcripts, which were not then 
available. R. 376:85. Defendant's attorney also objected to allowing the jury to view the 
video tape of the proceedings, maintaining that they should "rely on their memory and their 
notes." R. 376: 85. When the jury reconvened, the court told the jury that no transcripts 
were available and explained its reservations in allowing the jury to view the video tape of 
the proceedings. R. 376: 89-90. The court indicated that it would attempt to "find some 
reason to provide [the transcripts] if and only if [the jury] simply cannot reach a verdict 
without [them]." R. 376: 90. However, the court "encourage[d] [them] to try to reach a 
verdict as hard as [they] can without having been provided that additional information." R. 
376: 90. 
The court recessed near midnight, some twelve hours into deliberations, after the jury 
informed the court that although it had reached a verdict as to one of the defendants, it was 
The jury also requested a calendar that shows the phases of the moon during that 
time period and the weather conditions between April 3rd and April 9th. R. 376: 83. 
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still unable to reach a verdict as to the other. R. 376: 93-95, R. 377: 4. When the jury 
returned for deliberations the next morning, it delivered another note to the judge which read: 
| Testimony on one answer on Misty cross examine. j 
I First question by defense: "Why did you change your \ 
\ answer." I 
R. 377:4. The court then notified the parties of its intentions to first, have the jury announce 
its verdict as to the defendant for whom they had reached a verdict, and second, to re-read 
the testimony which the jury sought to review. R. 377: 4-5. The court asked whether 
"anyone want[ed] to note any objections." R. 377: 5. Counsel for both defendants said they 
had none. R. 377: 5. 
After the jury announced Jordan's guilty verdict, the court queried the jury as to what 
portion of the testimony it wished to review. R. 377: 6-10. The court determined that the 
jury wished to review Misty's response to the prosecutor's question on re-direct as to why 
she "testified] at the preliminary hearing that defendant fired the last shot and testified] now 
that Jordan shot the last shot?" R. 377: 7-10. 
After additional review of the video tape, the court read two excerpts of Misty's 
testimony. The court read the following from Misty's cross-examination by defendant's 
attorney: 
Defense And you also told him in this particular statement, um, you 
Counsel were not sure who said, "I shot him in the head," but you 
thought it was Terril. 
Misty Ernst Yes. 
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Defense Okay. And the reason you said that was to protect Jordan? 
Counsel 
Mistv Ernst Yes. 
R. 374:81; R. 377:15. The court also read the following from the prosecutor's re-direct 
examination of Misty: 
Prosecutor Do you recall at one point in that preliminary hearing when 
your attorney stood up and indicated that you hadn't been 
fully truthful with me? 
Mistv Ernst Yes. 
Prosecutor And what occurred after that? 
Misty Ernst I started telling the truth 
Prosecutor And what was the purpose for you being less than forthright 
in the morning testimony that you gave? 
Mistv Ernst Because I thought if I didn't tell the truth, that they couldn't 
find Jordan guilty of it. 
R. 374:104-05; R.377:15-16. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues this was 
reversible error. Aplt. Brf. at 96-100. 
B. DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO A RE-READING OF THE TESTIMONY. 
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be made in order to preserve 
an issue for appeal." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989) {citing Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a)); accord Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at % 11. Although defendant objected to giving 
the jury a transcript or video tape of the testimony in response to the jury's first note, he did 
not object the next morning to a re-reading of the relevant testimony in response to the jury's 
second note. When asked if there were any objections, defense counsel responded, "No." 
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R. 377: 5. Having made a conscious decision to abandon his former objection, defendant 
cannot now claim error on appeal, even under a plain error analysis. See State v. Medina, 
738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (refusing to apply plain error analysis to defendant's 
unpreserved claim where counsel "consciously chose not to assert any objection" and so 
indicated to court). In any event, defendant has not argued the applicability of either the 
plain error or exceptional circumstances exceptions. Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022 (refusing to 
address an unpreserved claim on appeal where defendant has not argued plain error or 
exceptional circumstances). 
C. RE-READING THE TESTIMONY WAS WITHIN THE JUDGE'S DISCRETION. 
In any event, defendant has not shown any error, much less plain error. To show plain 
error, defendant must show in the first instance the existence of an error. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). He must then show that the error is both "obvious and 
harmful." Whittle, 780 P.2d at 821; accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant has not met 
that burden. 
1. Rule 17 Does Not Preclude the Re-reading of Testimony. 
Relying on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alerius, defendant contends a trial 
court is without authority to re-read portions of witness testimony because rule 17, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not expressly authorize a trial court to do so. Aplt. Brf. 
at 98. That claim ignores this Court's pronouncement long ago that "it is within the trial 
court's discretion to grant the jury's request to re-read parts of the testimony." State v. Hines, 
6 Utah 2d 126, 129, 307 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1957). 
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Moreover, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alerius, which literally means "the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another," does not apply here. Field v. Boyer Co., 
L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998). "[T]his principle is only an aid to statutory 
interpretation; it is not a rule of law, and it has only limited application." Cullum v. Farmers 
Ins. Exchange, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993). The principle "appropriately applies only 
where in the natural association of ideas the contrast between a specific subject which is 
expressed and one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter was not 
intended to be included." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1025 (internal quotes and footnotes omitted). 
No such inference can be made here. 
Rule 17(m) discusses the procedure by which a jury may obtain further clarification 
of the law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). Articulating that procedure does not support an 
inference that the trial court is without power to re-read portions of testimony. Nor does 
subsection (k), which identifies tangible things which a jury "may take with them" into 
deliberations, support such an inference. Utah R. Crim. P. 17(k). Defendant nevertheless 
argues that rule 17fs plain import is that a jury should only rely on their own recollections of 
the evidence in rendering a verdict. Aplt. Brf. at 98. However, even after a re-reading of 
testimony, juror's still must rely on their own recollection of that testimony when they return 
to deliberate. 
In sum, rule 17 does not purport to restrict the court's authority to re-read portions of 
the transcript upon a request by the jury. Rather, that authority lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Hines, 6 Utah 2d at 129, 307 P.2d at 889. 
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2. The Portion of Testimony Read Was Sufficient 
When exercising its discretion to re-read testimony, the court must "observe caution 
that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner, that there is a likelihood of it 
being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury which would confer an unfair advantage 
on either party." Id. Defendant now argues for the first time on appeal that the court abused 
its discretion because it "focus[ed] on Ernst's inconsistencies about who fired the last shot, 
rather than about Ernst's inconsistencies regarding who fired the first shot, the area of 
concern to the jury." Aplt. Brf. at 99. This claim is without merit. 
After the jury rendered its verdict for Jordan, the trial court sought to clarify what 
testimony the jury wanted to review: 
Juror She said that at first Terril was the first: one to shoot, but then 
she changed it to Jordan. And she was protecting Jordan first 
and then she changed it. 
Court Okay. That—that—that statement was as to who shot the last 
shot. Who shot the last shot. Not as to who shot the first shot. 
It was— 
Juror When she was trying to protect Jordan. 
Court Okay. I know—I—I thought that's what you were talking 
about and that subject is covered in actually not in cross 
examine, but it's covered in the re-direct examination by [the 
prosecutor]. "Why did you testify at the preliminary hearing 
that Terril fired the last shot and testifying now that Jordan 
shot the last shot?" That's the question. Is that the issue that 
you're wanting to cover? 
Juror [No audible response] 
R. 377: 9-10. The foregoing exchange makes clear that although the juror initially referred 
to the first shot, that reference was mistaken. This only makes sense because Misty never 
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testified, either at the preliminary hearing or at trial, as to who fired the first shot. The jury's 
concern, therefore, could only have been in reference to the identity of the person who fired 
the last shot. Moreover, no audible response from the jury was recorded to the judge's 
question as to whether that was in fact their concern; yet, the court proceeded as if the jury 
affirmed his understanding. R. 377:10. Accordingly, the only reasonable conclusion is that 
the jury affirmed the court's understanding that the issue was as the court articulated. 
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in failing to include the following 
additional testimony: 
Prosecutor And what happened to make you change your testimony in the 
afternoon? Did you have a talk with me? Is that part of it? 
Misty Ernst Yeah. 
Prosecutor Did you have a talk with your attorney? 
Misty Ernst Yes. 
Prosecutor Prior to that time, you had agreed that you would testify 
truthfully and for that you would get some consideration on 
your charge. 
Misty Ernst Yes. 
Prosecutor And you were told you were in jeopardy of that. 
Misty Ernst Yes. 
Prosecutor So you came back in the afternoon and what did you do? 
Misty Ernst Told the whole truth. 
R. 374: 105. If defendant had requested it, the court may very well have included the 
additional testimony. However, it was not necessary to respond to the jury's inquiry. As 
noted, the jury wanted to review Misty's testimony that "she was trying to protect Jordan." 
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R. 377: 10. The testimony that was re-read explained why she initially claimed that 
defendant fired the last shot—the question of interest to the jury. The additional testimony 
explained why she was now testifying that Jordan fired the last shot—to keep her plea 
agreement to testify truthfully. 
D. ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
In any event, any error in re-reading the testimony was harmless. See Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1208. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the re-read testimony, which only tended to 
exculpate defendant, harmed him. Rather than testifying that defendant admitted to firing 
the last shot, Misty testified that Jordan admitted to doing so. Counsel for defendant used 
that point to his advantage in closing: 
She comes to the preliminary hearing in a courtroom right here, this 
courtroom. She's placed under oath and she admitted to you Tuesday that she 
lied under oath at the preliminary hearing. Why did she say she was lying? 
Not to protect herself, she says, but to protect Jordan. And what does she 
consistently lie about when we compare it with her trial testimony? She 
consistently lied about Terril being the person who shot James Eaton in the 
head. But when she came to court, then her testimony changed. Then it 
was—then it was Jordan who said it. 
R. 376: 53. Counsel then reminded the jury that evidence was introduced indicating Misty 
did not have a reputation for honesty. R. 376: 53. He pointed out that her account was "in 
what Jordan told her," and that "Terril didn't tell her anything." R. 376: 54. He further 
explained: 
She turns around after her questioning. After her arrest, she enters into a 
plea agreement—a plea bargain with the prosecutor where, according to her 
testimony, how much punishment she receives is going to depend on how her 
testimony—how she testifies, how well she testifies. But the important thing 
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about that is she doesn't—she doesn't even remember what crime she pled 
guilty to. 
I think the evidence shows that Misty Ernst was at the homicide scene on 
Ucolo Road on the 3rd of April and I think from the evidence you can clearly 
infer that she participated in the killing of James Eaton. The question you 
must answer, with regard to the case versus my client Terril Calliham, is are 
you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot James Eaton? 
R. 376: 54. The jury, therefore, was well aware of Misty's plea bargain. The re-read 
testimony also reinforced the defense's claim that Misty could not be believed. And while 
it offered a legitimate explanation for Misty's change in testimony, it did nothing to further 
incriminate defendant. Indeed, the Court may safely assume that counsel consciously chose 
not to insist on any further reading because he wanted the jury to give credence to that 
explanation. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59 (holding that a party cannot rely on plain error if 
"counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court 
into error"). 
V. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT REGARDING 
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT AND DOES NOT OTHERWISE WARRANT REVERSAL 
OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
In his last claim on appeal, defendant contends that the prosecutor incorrectly 
explained accomplice liability in his rebuttal argument. Aplt. Brf. at 100-05. Defendant did 
not, however, object to the prosecutor's argument at trial. See R. 376:69. The failure to 
object to the prosecutor's remarks constitutes a waiver of the claim unless defendant can 
establish plain error. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,785 (Utah 1992). As discussed in point 
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IV above, to show plain error, defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [defendant]." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant has not met that burden. 
A prosecutor's comments in closing argument will constitute prosecutorial misconduct 
if they call to the jurors' attention matters which they could not properly consider in reaching 
a verdict. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 42, | 39, 994 P.2d 177. 
However, even improper remarks will not warrant reversal unless defendant establishes "that 
the prosecutor's remarks were obviously improper and harmful." Colwell, 2000 UT 42, at 
f 39. Utah's accomplice liability statute reads in relevant part as follows: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999). A review of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, in light 
of the accomplice liability statute, reveals no error. 
The prosecutor explained accomplice liability as follows: 
Now, you've heard some testimony from our expert and from their expert 
that basically says, "You know what? This may have occurred in this way. 
There may have been one gun—"excuse me"—"there may have been two guns 
and one shooter." Well there's the instruction in here, No. 6, that talks about 
accomplice liability. Ladies and gentleman, if you drive down to First Security 
Bank here and somebody walks in with a mask on and holds that bank up and 
you're sittin' out in the car in a get away car, you're guilty of bank robbery. 
If you participate in that, it doesn't matter that you're the one in the bank that 
hands them the note. 
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I'm not asking you to believe that there was only one shooter here and there 
was two guns and one shooter, but what I'm saying is even if you believe it, 
Instruction No. 6 says, "One who does not actually commit a crime, but who 
aids, solicits, encourages or commands another in the commission of a crime 
may be convicted of a crime as an accomplice." Well if that person intends 
that it be committed. Aids, solicits, encourages, commands. Terril Calliham 
was standing right there. You can still find Terril Calliham guilty under that 
right there if he helped in this in any way if he provided a gun, if he helped him 
get away, if he tried to help him with an alibi. 
R. 376: 69 (emphasis added). 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's argument constituted misconduct because 
"one's mere presence at a scene of a crime does not give rise to probable cause, let alone 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Brf. at 103. The prosecutor, however, never 
implied that presence alone was sufficient. He recited the accomplice liability statute, and 
reiterated, "Aids, solicits, encourages, commands." R. 376: 69. He further stated that 
defendant could be convicted "if he helped" in the murder. R. 376: 69. Nothing in his 
argument suggested that defendant could be convicted as an accomplice for simply being 
present. 
Defendant further argues that even if he provided a gun to Jordan, he could not be 
convicted as an accomplice if he did not have the requisite intent. Aplt. Brf. at 103. Again, 
the prosecutor did not argue otherwise. To the contrary, the prosecutor expressly pointed out 
that a person could be convicted as an accomplice "if that person intends that it be 
committed." R. 376: 69. 
Finally, defendant claims that it was error to argue he could be found guilty as an 
accomplice if he helped Jordan escape or create an alibi. Aplt. Brf. at 103. A person who 
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intentionally assists someone in the commission of an offense by providing the means of 
escape is without question an accomplice. See State v. Murphy, 26 Utah 2d 330,489 P.2d 
430 (Utah 1971) (acknowledging that a person who intentionally participates in a robbery by 
providing transportation to and from the robbery is guilty as a principal). It follows that 
defendant could also be convicted as a principal if he helped Jordan avoid apprehension by 
establishing an alibi. Defendant argues that helping Jordan escape or create an alibi would 
more likely constitute obstruction of justice under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999). Aplt. 
Brf. at 103. However, the difference between a conviction as an accomplice for the principal 
crime and a conviction for obstructing justice under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999) lies 
in the mens rea element of the crimes. Under the obstructing justice statute, the State must 
show defendant acted with the "intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
306. On the other hand, the accomplice liability statute requires proof that the defendant 
"act[ed] with the mental state required for the commission of [the principal] offense." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202. Thus, where a defendant intended to help another commit a murder 
by assisting him in creating an alibi, he is arguably guilty of that murder as an accomplice. 
Even if the prosecutor misstated the law, the error was neither obvious nor prejudicial. 
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, . To show harm, defendant must establish that "under the 
circumstances of the [ ] case, there was a probability that the jurors were influenced by the 
prosecutor's remarks." State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). The prosecutor's 
remarks here were but a brief alternative argument, subordinate to the State's primary 
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contention that defendant actually participated in the shooting of the victim. "That defense 
counsel at trial did not object to this portion of the closing argument is a sign that what was 
said sounded less exciting at trial than appellate counsel now would have it seem." 
Commonwealth v. Deveau, 606 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Mass. App. 1993). Moreover, the court 
instructed the jury that "[s]tatements of the lawyers are not evidence." R. 342; see Kohl, 
2000 UT 35, at f 24. 
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for the same reasons. "To 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [defendant] must meet the heavy burden of 
showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). As 
discussed above, the prosecutor's argument was not improper, and therefore, counsel had no 
reason to object. "' [Fjailure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile 
if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.'" Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 
1109 (Utah 1983) (quotingState v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,58 (Utah 1982)); accord Whittle, 
1999 UT 96, at f 34. Strategic decisions, like counsel made here, also preclude a claim of 
ineffective assistance. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f 19. Finally, because the prejudice 
showing required to establish ineffective assistance is comparable to harmfulness showing 
required under plain error analysis, defendant also fails to meet the second prong of his 
ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,124 n. 15 (Utah 1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this 131 day of July, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
lY S. GRAY 
DISTANT ATTORNEVGENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah 
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Addenda 
Addendum 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution. Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, g 76-2-202 (1999) 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 78-24-1 (1996) 
All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter, 
who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known 
their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons 
who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor 
those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their 
opinions on matters of religious belief; although, in every case the credibility of 
the witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in which he testifies, by the 
character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his character for truth, 
honesty or integrity, or by his motives, or by contradictory evidence; and the jury 
are the exclusive judges of his credibility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1996) 
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
COURT RULES 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 
* * * 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received 
as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any notes 
of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any 
other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together 
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if 
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. 
The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having 
the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response 
thereto shall be entered in the record. 
* * * 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 
* * * 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the 
prosecution and then by the defense. 
UtahR. Crim. P. 18(cont) 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the 
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged 
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was 
instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship 
when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would 
be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because 
he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, 
or having complained against or having been accused by him in a criminal 
prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and 
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the 
case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant 
for the act charged as an offense; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(cont) 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror 
from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the 
facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on 
of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on 
the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon 
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding 
such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
* * * 
Addendum 2 
1 A. I would think that what they say is true and yeah. 
2 Q. And that would be because of your friendship with 
3 those witnesses--
4 A. And my background with them. 
5 Q. — a n d your knowledge of them in the past. 
6 A. Right. 
7 Q. And if one witness that was your friend would 
8 testify as to one thing and another witness would testify as 
9 to something opposite, you'd be more likely to believe the 
0 witness who is your friend because you've known them in the 
1 past; right? 
L2 A. I would. 
L3 MR. McCAUGHEY: That's all. 
L4 MZ. MORGAN: I don't have anything, Your Honor. 
L5 THE COURT: Okay. Mz. Francom, you are excused and 
L6 you do not need to come back. Thank you. 
L7 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
L8 THE COURT: Ask Albert Eugene Steele as to come in. 
19 (Bailiff summonsed candidate from outside 
courtroom.) 
20 ALBERT EUGENE STEELE 
21 called by the Court, having been duly 
22 II sworn, was voir dired as follows: 
23 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
2 4 BY THE COURT: 
25 Q. Mr. Steele, Ifve read your questionnaire and so have 
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the attorneys and I want to go right as to the last question. 
You said that there is a reason why you believe you could not 
be impartial as a juror in this case. You say you're close 
personal friends with both the Callihams and the 
Hollingsworths; is that right. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You think that would make it impossible for you to 
be fair as to both the State and the defense in this case. 
A. I think that I could be fair, but I think that I 
would have a very hard time, ah, serving in that capacity. 
Q. Well if—if the only thing that happens is that 
you're really uncomfortable,— 
A. That's basically it. 
Q. —okay. You think you could still do your duty? 
A. Well I think I could be fair and impartial about 
what is presented to me. 
Q. Let's suppose the evidence—let's suppose it was not 
these two that were on trial, but somebody else that you don't 
know at all. Let's suppose that the evidence is—comes in and 
you think they're guilty. With the defendants you don't know, 
I guess you'd find them guilty if you thought they were 
guilty. Would you hesitate to do that because these are 
grandchildren of people you know who are close personal 
friends? 
A. I would hesitate, yes. But beyond a reasonable 
J. M. LIDDELL 
doubt, I think that the courts are set up to that way and 
that's what I believed all my life. If it was beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then I think that I would have to. 
Q. As a practical matter, would that be a different 
beyond a reasonable doubt, though with these defendants than 
with some other defendants, simply because of who you know? 
Would you stop one more time and say, "Wait a minute. I 
really want to be sure this time." Or would you go ahead and 
say, "I'm sorry. I have to let the chips fall where they may. 
I'm findin' these guys guilty." 
A. This is basically what the court system is set up 
for and what I believe very strongly. I think any juror has 
to weigh the evidence presented to him, whether it's he knows 
them or whether he doesn't, you know, and it's a very 
difficult thing to find anybody, I think, guilty of any crime. 
I think that's a very strong thing to put on anybody's 
shoulders. And I think as a jury I would have to look twice 
no matter who the person was. 
Q. Okay. Would it be irrelevant to you—ultimately 
would it be irrelevant to you that you know the grandparents? 
A. Basically and honestly I think that it might affect 
me in the very long run either way. That's why I put that on 
the questionnaire. I know these people. They're my friends. 
There's a difference from between to me of being somebody 
else's friend and their being my friend. I consider them my 
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friends. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's why we asked the question. 
Um, I think I'm gonna let him go. Somebody want to try to 
change that? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: If I could just ask a couple of 
questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey. 
DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. McCAUGHEY: 
Q. Mr. Steele, the Court's going to tell you that in 
order to at least to presume innocent, in order to convict 
them, you have to find it beyond a reasonable doubt that they 
did that. That's the standard they're going to—the Court's 
gonna tell you. Do you think you could follow that standard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if the State put on enough evidence and you were 
convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, you could find these two 
guilty? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's no matter whether you were friends with 
the grandparents or not, you would still try to follow what 
that Judge told you to do— 
A. Yes. 
Q. —and weigh that evidence? And you're confidence 
you could do that?— 
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A, 
Q. 
Yes. 
—even though it would be difficult? 
Even though it' 
It is difficult 
On any case. 
3 difficult. 
in any case, as you sa^ 
—to convict any anybody of a crime. 
Correct. 
But you could follow that according to 
instruction? 
A. 
Q. 
they may. 
doubt, fi 
You could 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And as says Court said, "Let the chips 
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right. 
S VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
guilty. 
fre 
ny 
J. M. LIDDELL 
OFFICIAL REPORTER PAGE 5 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BY MR. HALLS: 
Q. Mr. Steele, you recognize that for you to be a 
competent juror your responsibility is to be fair and 
impartial to both sides. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I've written a couple of notes here from your 
conversation. You said it would be difficult to find anyone 
guilty of a crime. That's a difficult task. 
A. That is a difficult task, but if it's what's 
presented, I think you have to go with what's presented. 
Q. Okay. And I've made—this is my comment. I've 
written here that you would hesitate to convict. 
A. Would I hesitate to convict? 
Q. I've written that and I'm gonna follow that up with 
this statement. If you are a victim in this case—if you were 
a victim, if you were a person sitting—I guess what I am 
saying is on the State's side of this case, with your 
knowledge that you are close friends with the Hollingsworths 
and close friends with the Callihams, are you gonna be the 
type of juror that would give the State—the victims in this 
case a pair fair and impartial jury? Or are you gonna be so 
reluctant to convict and so uncomfortable to face your friends 
that you would hesitate to the point where you're not being 
fair and impartial to the State's position? 
A. I don't believe so. I think that whatever is 
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presented, I will look at it fairly. If they are my friends 
and they hear the same evidence, they will understand why I'd 
do this. One of the things—and I think I should tell you 
this. One of the things that I have really thought about 
being in here and sitting here, I think probably the worst 
thing that I could think of is if I wasn't convinced and 
everybody else was, it would not be fair to the defendants for 
me to hang this hearing. I don't think I could do that. I 
think that everybody in there is going to have to have enough 
evidence presented that they will believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I don't think this is going—in most juries it is very 
clear cut where you have whether you have that reasonable 
doubt or not basically. I have found that, you know, you'll 
either present much more evidence to or against and so I think 
that, you know, in order to be fair and impartial, you have to 
look at both sides. And I have thought about that and I think 
that would be a disservice if I didn't believe that there was 
a reasonable doubt to go ahead with the State. If I did 
believe that there's a reasonable doubt in my own heart, I 
would have to rule the other way. And this is what's gone 
through my mind ever since I got this summons. 
Q. Maybe this is editorial here. It's you made a 
comment about if the family members are sitting here listening 
to the evidence, they are going to know you did the right 
thing one way or another because they're gonna to hear the 
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same evidence you did. Is it your experience that when 
parents, for instance, or close family members are dealing 
with family members, that they're totally rational in what 
they hear and what they believe their kids have done or not 
done? 
A. Well I find that most parents hate to believe that 
their children could do anything, but yet they're our parents. 
And I'm a parent. My children do things. I believe that most 
parents, deep in their heart, are rational enough to know 
that. That is my own opinion. 
Q. If there is a situation where the Hollingsworths or 
the Callihams hear this testimony, you believe that it may 
show guilt, they believe that it doesn't, that's gonna place 
you in a difficult situation. If your friendship is in 
jeopardy, are you gonna hesitate to make a verdict of guilty? 
A. I don't think my friendship would be in jeopardy 
either way. 
MR. HALLS: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Any more? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. Nothing. 
M2. MORGAN: Nothing. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Steele, what we are going to 
see is I'm going to excuse from you the courtroom. I want you 
to wait. Go out through this door. Just wait outside of the 
door for a few minutes and then we'll tell you whether you 
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need to come back here at 3:00 o'clock or whether you don't 
need to come back at all. If you come back at 3:00, you might 
want to call to be sure that we really need you. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
(Candidate left courtroom.) 
THE COURT: You challenge him for cause, Mr. Halls. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I would like to challenge 
Mr. Steele for cause. 
THE COURT: Let me tell you where I think I am with 
this one. He's obviously given it a lot of thought and I 
think he's, ah, persuaded himself that he can be impartial. 
But he's, you know, he's made some statements that he hasn't 
completely retracted, which might give us a concern both ways 
actually. He said he didn't think he could hang a jury if 
everybody else was convinced and he wasn't because he would 
worry that he was affected by the relationship. He also said 
that he didn't think he could consider it totally irrelevant. 
Now Mr. McCaughey rehabilitated him some. 
I'd really be stickin' my neck out if I kept a juror 
with these answers against a defense challenge. I think I'm 
probably gonna postpone deciding on Mr. Steele to see if I 
absolutely have to have him. I can maybe reason through to 
where he would be a good juror, an impartial juror. And in 
fact, he may have thought about this so much that he would be 
one of the—the most impartial jurors. But he's awful close. 
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You could tell itfs just hitting him real close to his heart. 
So Ifm probably gonna end up excusing Mr. Steele. Tell Mr. 
Steele to come back at 3:00 o'clock. 
Let's get Beverly—hang on. We just had Harold 
Yanito show up. Come and get his questionnaires, counsel. 
Harold Yanito. 
(Bailiff summonsed witness from outside courtroom.) 
HAROLD YANITO 
called by the Court, having been duly 
sworn, was voir dired as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr, Yanito, come up here and sit in this 
chair, please, 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. Did you take the oath earlier? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. We have your questionnaire answers. You say 
you did hear something about this case on the radio. What did 
you hear? 
A. Ah, it's been awhile so I really don't remember. It 
just went through and I didn't really listen to it. As far as 
I know, I just heard it and that was it, so. 
Q. Someone had been—you knew someone had been killed 
and not just died. 
A. I couldn't tell you what exactly was said. But I 
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my clerks, pursuant to my guidelines. 
Richard Max Bailey was excused earlier. 
Rosalie Reilly; are you gonna try to rehabilitate 
her? 
MZ. MORGAN: Absolutely. 
MR. HALLS: Did you say that Mr. Dutchie was 
excused? 
THE COURT: Yes. My clerk excused him. 
THE COURT: Good luck. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Is there anything as to presumption? 
ROSALIE REILLY 
called by the Court, having been duly 
sworn, was voir dired as follows: 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. Mz. Reilly, you said you—if you had to try the 
youngest defendant, if you had to be a juror in his case, you 
couldn't; is that true? 
A. Well I think I would have a hard time being 
impartial, because of his youth. 
Q. You said in your questionnaire, "I wouldn't be able 
to pass judgment." Is it "I wouldn't be able to"? or "I would 
have a hard time"? 
A. I've given a lot of thought to this. I think I 
would have a hard time. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
PAGE 
Q. Okay. And youfve discussed motions with Happy 
Morgan? 
A. Yes, I have. I believe it was a change of venue. 
She asked me how to do that and I gave her some ideas. We 
didn't go into the specifics of the pleas. 
Q. Urn, you also say that you know a child who was close 
to the victim and he was quite upset about what had happened. 
That might color you; might lead you to be more harsh. 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think I'm going to excuse her. 
You may try to rehabilitate, if you'd like. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Why don't you give us a shot, Your 
Honor. 
DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. McCAUGHEY: 
Q. Are you saying then—let me understand—that you 
don't think you could listen to the evidence in this case and 
listen to Judge Anderson's instructions and be a fair and 
impartial juror? 
A. I thought—I think it would be difficult, but I 
think I would do that. I certainly do that in other context. 
In my own practice of law I do that where I set my feelings 
aside. 
Q. A lot of things we do are real difficult to do. 
A. Yes. 
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Q. But your statement is that in spite of that 
difficulty, you could follow his instruction then you could 
listen to the evidence and be a fair and impartial juror to 
both sides. 
A. I think so. I think probably more so in this type 
of case I would be fair to both sides. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Okay. That's all I have. 
DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MZ. MORGAN: 
Q. The motion for change of venue that we discussed, 
that was more than six months ago; correct? 
A. I can't even remember. But I'm sure it was quite a 
while ago. 
Q. And I asked you if you had ever done one in this 
county and you couldn't find one, so weren't sure? 
A. Right. 
Q. And that's about the extent of the conversation that 
we had. 
A. I don't recall the whole conversation, but that 
sounds right. 
Q. So I didn't, urn, talk to you specifically about 
anything with my case. I was just asking if you had some sort 
of a form. 
A. Yes. 
MZ. MORGAN: Urn, that's all I have, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Halls. 
PLAINTIFF'S VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALLS: 
Q. Mz. Reilly, we!ve had a number of cases together. 
A, True. 
Q. You could look at me and cock your head sideways. 
You disagree with how I prosecute a number of cases; is that 
correct? 
A. Well I think that's kind of an over generalization. 
I disagree with the approach of your office to drug cases. 
Q. Your comment on those has been anybody—that in a 
first time offense, that we ought to have it just an across 
the board policy of doing a plea and abeyance on all drug 
cases. 
A. Pretty much giving them a second chance, yes. 
Q. And by my not doing that Ifm ruining the lives of 
these young people? 
A. I probably have said that to you. I don't remember 
the words. 
Q. And is that—we have a person here who's what, 17 
years ago old? No prior record. 
A. This isn't a drug case. 
Q. No. But you don't have some of the same feelings on 
a case with a youthful defendant? 
A. I think it's harder with a youthful defendant and 
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that was what I was trying to indicate in my answer. But I 
don't think that it automatically, because of someone's youth, 
means they should be entitled to a second chance, no matter 
what. 
Q. Urn, you also believe that officers don't testify 
honestly. 
A. In my experience I've had that happen. 
Q. Well it's not just that you've had it happen. You 
think that it's common place. 
A. I don't know that I put that it's common place. 
Q. Well you didn't. That's my word. But you think— 
A. I think it happens. 
Q. A lot. 
A. I don't know if I would qualify it as a lot. I 
think they're the same as any other witness. 
Q. Well—and I don't know that I want you to get into 
any specifics either, but when it talks about how you feel 
about prosecutors, you say no generalized feelings, only 
specifics. You have specific incidences with me where we've 
kind of locked horns on different things; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have—you have some difficulties, urn—well, 
would it be fair to say that you have some animosities because 
of those? 
A. I don't think that would be fair. 
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Q. What would be fair? 
A. I think that we have differences of opinion and 
sometimes it gets heated. It's a heated battle when things 
get said. But I don't think there's anything specific to you. 
Q. You indicate on the very back page here that you 
know a person who is close to the victim and you feel that 
that may color or there may be some sympathy or concern 
because of that? 
A. Yes. I have a friend who has a son and they moved 
from Blanding to the Dove Creek area and I talked to him one 
day and he was pretty torn up about the death of this—of the 
victim in this case. And that impacted me and I thought out 
of fairness I needed to say that. I had a hard time with the 
fact that he was so upset. 
Q. The second thing on the back page indicates 
that—well maybe I ought to follow that up a little bit. I 
perceive that maybe you're saying that because of how upset 
they were, and so forth, you have some empathy more for the 
victim because of that reason. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And then the next one says that because of the age 
of Jordan Calliham, you're aware that if he's convicted, he's 
gonna go to prison because of the offense. 
A. That would be my guess. 
Q. And you say here he'll most likely be victimized and 
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for that reason you feel you wouldn't be able to pass 
judgment? 
A. I think it would be real hard. I was just trying to 
be fair on either side. In terms of my friend's son that had 
such a hard time by the death where he was crying, I think 
that I had a lot of empathy for that. And then at the same 
time, I think it's hard to make a decision when someone's sent 
up and feeling like a decision against him or making a harsh 
judgment would effect him for the rest of his life. 
Q. Even though there may be an instruction that says 
you shouldn't be concerned about what the—what the sentence 
would be. 
A. Right. I understand that absolutely. 
Q. But that—you've indicated here honestly that that 
would be in your mind. 
A. I just tried to indicate anything that I thought 
might make me not an impartial juror. I don't know that that 
would be definitely the way I would go. I think I could 
listen to judge Anderson's instructions. 
MR. HALLS: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
MZ. MORGAN: Your Honor, I have a couple, if the 
court doesn't mind. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm getting a—one of the things 
that happens when I let the lawyers ask questions, it goes 
longer. 
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talk 
some 
that 
that 
Q. 
MZ. MORGAN: I111 talk fast, 
fast. 
FURTHER DEFENSE VOIR DIRE 
BY MZ. MORGAN: 
Mr. Halls has indicated that 
I promise. I won't 
EXAMINATION 
you and he have had 
cases where you and he have locked horns. Itfs also true 
you and I have had a lot of cases 
horns; correct? 
you 
some 
1 this 
Crai< 
A. 
Q. 
That's true. 
And it's true that you work J 
where you and I lock 
for Legal Services and 
typically are representing women who are accusing a man of 
sort 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
hear 
3? 
A. 
Q. 
beyond a 
guil ty of 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
of violent act toward them? 
For abuse yes. 
And so very often I'm on the other side of that. 
Almost consistently you're on the other side. 
Do you think that you would hold that against me in 
ing any more or less than you 
No. 
would hold against 
And if Mr. Halls were to present to you a case 
reasonable doubt that either of these individuals was 
this crime, would you be able to find them guilty? 
Yes. 
Absolutely? 
Yes. 
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MZ. MORGAN: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. How did you know there was a younger defendant? 
A. Ifve been in court before when there's been motions 
and I noticed them. 
Q. What kinds of motions have we considered when you've 
been in court? 
A. I can't ever remember what they were. I was 
waiting. And there are a few cases or I think a few times 
where I had something on the docket and the Calliham matter 
come up afterwards and I remember seeing them from that. I 
don't specifically remember the motions. I just remember 
being struck by the youth of both defendants actually. 
Q. How did you know the victim—how did the victim die, 
as far as you know? Do you know how the victim died? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it from knife wounds? Hit by a car? Or hit by 
a tire iron? Or shot? What? 
A. Shot is the only thing I was aware of. 
Q. You heard shot. Did you know how the police found 
out? Got evidence to prosecute these two defendants; did you 
know? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know anything about who might be 
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testifying against them? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any idea of how they may have got the 
weapons? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what punishment is fixed by law for 
murder? 
A. No, 
Q. You don't? 
A. Not right off the top. I've never done a case that 
involved murder before. I know that this is not a capital 
case. 
Q. So do you know anything about the possible kinds of 
crimes there are? What possible punishments there are? You 
don't know that about the Utah sentencing scheme? 
A. Um-um. I've never looked at it and I don't. 
Q. You don't know whether there is a felony or a 
misdemeanor? 
A. Oh, I know it's a felony. 
Q. And you don't know whether it's—do you know what 
kinds of felonies Utah has? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What kinds does it have? 
A. It's a first degree felony. 
Q. So you know it's a First Degree Felony. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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A, Right. 
Q. Do your do you know what the punishment is for the 
First Degree Felony? 
A. Well I think it's 15 to life. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But I know that there's different circumstancess the 
Judge may consider and I don't know, under in these 
circumstances, what the Court would. 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't have any more questions 
for her. Anything for you? 
Just step outside this door. We'll let you know in 
a second whether or not you need to come back. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
(Candidate left courtroom.) 
THE COURT: I think I'm gonna let Mz. Reilly go. 
She knows more than we would permit any other juror to know. 
The Court of appeals has reversed a conviction because a 
Bailiff talked to a juror and said, "When we have six jurors, 
we're trying a Class-A Misdemeanor. When we have eight 
jurors, we're trying a felony," and from that the juror would 
then infer from other jurors whether it was a misdemeanor or a 
felony. She knows this is a First Degree Felony. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: She doesn't know the penalty, 
though. 
THE COURT: Huh? 
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MR. McCAUGHEY: She doesn't know the penalty 
THE COURT: She's wrong on whether it's 15 to life 
or not, but she knows that it's a First Degree Felony. And 
there's all these other problems. So anything you want to say 
briefly? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I think my position is I think she 
qualifies and she ought to stay on the jury panel. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MZ. MORGAN: And mine would be the same, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That was kind of the straw that broke 
the camel's back for Mz. Reilly. She's given reasons why she 
might Judge the defendants more harshly; and then in her 
questionnaire she said, "I wouldn't be able to pass judgment 
on the younger defendant." 
She's been in court during some of the motions. She 
has a relationship, which is not necessarily very good, with 
two of the lawyers involved in the case, so I'm going to 
excuse her, unless you want me to keep her, Mr. Halls. If you 
all agree, I'll leave her on. 
MR. HALLS: I don't, Your Honor. I'm just glad 
we're gonna be left without me saying anything. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Ha-ha, ha-ha, ha. 
THE COURT: Okay. I've been in court and seen the 
two of you together. Tell her she can go. She doesn't need 
to come back. 
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Addendum 3 
) 0 < f i 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
JORDAN CALLIHAM 
TERRIL CALLIHAM 
MISTY ERNST, 
Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PSYCHIATRIC 
EVALUATION 
Case No. 9917-70 
9917-69 
9917-68 
Defendant. 
Defendant Jordan Calliham ("Jordan") has filed a motion 
requesting that Misty Ernst ("Misty"), the state1s witness, be 
ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation with a Dr. Featherstone 
to address whether: 
1. Misty has a propensity to lie due to mental illness or 
personality disorder. 
2. Misty is able to separate fantasy from reality. 
3. Misty has a mental illness or personality disorder which 
alters her ability to remember events as they occurred. 
4. Misty is delusional due to mental illness or personality 
disorder. 
5. Misty has difficulty, due to mental illness or personality 
disorder, separating dreams from reality. 
6. Misty1s admitted hallucinations would impact her ability 
to accurately recall events. 
7. The false recounting of an event would eventually imprint 
false memories on Mistyfs mind. 
Jordan points to the following as supporting his request: 
1. At the preliminary hearing, Misty admitted to difficulty 
distinguishing reality from dreams. 
2. At the preliminary hearing, Misty admitted hallucinating. 
3. Misty went from uncontrollable crying to giggling and 
joking during a short time period during the preliminary hearing. 
4. Misty admitted using marijuana. 
5. Misty admitted that her parents would consider her 
untruthful. 
Misty has objected to the motion. The state has not stated a 
position. Misty opposes the motion because Mistyfs responses at 
the preliminary hearing are explained by her angst at testifying 
against Jordan, a former paramour, by the horrible details of the 
crime, by her desire to protect Jordan, and by her emotional 
turmoil. Her hallucinations are explained as "vivid nightmares" 
and her admission of truthfulness as her recognition that she had 
lied to her parents about her drug use. 
The court has read the transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
No audiotape or videotape was made at the hearing. 
The most recent pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court in 
this area is State v. Bakalov, the primary prosecution witness 
suffered from disassociative identity disorder ("DID"). 
Characteristics of DID include amnesia and memory gaps. Competing 
multiple personalities, each with its own behavior pattern and 
2 
memories, compete for dominance within the patient. The Supreme 
Court ruled that evidence of mental illness is material when it may 
reasonably cast doubt on the witness1 ability or willingness to 
tell the truth. The court therefore decided that the prosecutor 
should have disclosed the DID. However, since it was established 
after trial that the witness1 ability to recall the crime in 
question had not been affected by her illness, the conviction was 
affirmed. 
In this case, the only hint of mental illness is the adoption 
by the witness of defense counsel's characterization of her dreams 
as "hallucinations." There is no evidence of mental illness 
preceding the crime. The transcript does not suggest to the court 
that Misty suffers from mental illness. To the contrary, Misty 
appears capable of distinguishing between what happened, what she 
dreamed, what she worried about, what she told officers on 
different occasions, what she wanted to say, what she heard from 
others, and what Jordan and his brother might want her to say. If 
the court were to order a psychiatric examination based on Misty's 
preliminary hearing testimony, an examination would be required in 
virtually all cases. 
Jordan's suggestion that a psychiatric examination might 
disclose a propensity to lie runs up against the prohibition 
against using expert witnesses as human lie detectors. Similarly, 
though Jordan is entitled to introduce reputation testimony about 
Misty's credibility, he is probably not entitled to attack her 
credibility with an expert psychiatric witness unless a mental 
3 
illness has been established. Absent evidence of actual mental 
illness, the court will not order an examination to fish for it. 
The motion is denied. 
DATED the day of September, 1999. 
ict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and ORDER DENYING 
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
PO Box 850 
Monticello, UT 84535 
William Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 937 
Moab, UT 84532 
Happy Morgan 
Attorney at Law 
8 S. 100 E. 
Moab, UT 84532 
Kristine Rogers 
Attorney at Law 
10 W. 100 S., Suite 605 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED the sffi^ day of September, 1999. 
)eputy Cou 
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Addendum 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. N 
The testimony of Michael Gentry, Michael Mulvey, Adrian Killsinsight and Richard Raso 
has been admitted against only Jordan Calliham and not admitted against Terrii Calliham. 
Do not consider this evidence against Terrii Calliham. 
17 
Instruction No. IS 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were instructed that it could not be 
considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
Do not consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was 
admitted. 
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'=53 Jail Log: 
Ewent NlUBblr: 2S3ifcfc 
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I Lasti KILLSINSIGWT First I ADfUAN Midi I 
1 Addr: 33* W 400 3 Phonei (435)678-2171 I 
I City: BLANDIN6 ST: UT Zip: DOB: 1*8/15/81 SSNs - - j 
i , 
Tine/Date of Event! 09:32:37 01/04/0® Treatment Datei ^^s^_i / / 
Type of ev*nt: ADto Administrative Instructions 
Quantity; £• 00 
Officers GRAYSON REDD 
Booking Nueber* 
Description: 
<See below) 
S<^i JAMES EATON HOMICIDE-CASE #9904-93 
On December 33f 1999, I Interviewed Adrian Kill*insight in 
Blanding, Utah. 
Adrian stated the followingi 
1. Jordan stated that he was in jail enarged with aurder. 
S. Jordan stated that ne was suppose to have killed a boy fro* Dove 
Creek. 
3. Jordan stated that his girlfriend had said they went out in the 
woods to do the killing. 
I told Adrian that I thought he knew eore. I told hi* that I was told 
that Jordan had showed hie the hand notions of how he had held the gun. 
At that point7 Adrian stated that he did not want to testify. He 
further stated, "Do you think I want to get shot full of holes?" 
Adrian*» mother was present and told him how important it is to tell the 
truth. 
Adrian then told us the following* 
1. Jordan stated he had killed the victi*. 
2. Jordan stated that they went into the woods and "shot him up." 
3. Adri an deaonstrated to me how Jordan held his hand while stating 
that they had shot hin up. Adrian held his pointer and eiddle 
finger forward and thueb in the air. He then turned his hand 
sideways. 
^, Jordan stated that he shot hie 10 tine*. 
S. Jordan stated that he "capped hie Because his owed hie $300 for 
vr-
-^OM : HAPPY MORGAN LAU OFFICE FAX NO. : 4352593979 Nov. 09 2000 10:12PN D 5 
c o U e. 
€>• J o r d a n s t a t e d that t h e y " t o r t u r e d h i m " . T h e y "shot him u p " . 
DEPUTY GRAYSON REDD 
?0M : HAPPY MORGAN LAU OFFICE FAX NO. : 4352593979 Nov. 39 2000 10:13AM P8 
W-K-ti M )'. 51 ?« wCbTuHTTORNEY- FAX 4 ^ 2 ^ t l 9 rAOH 4 
UKfblNAL 
l2/£'9/99 SAN JUAN COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE ^3i 
28116 Jail Logs Page: 1 
Event Numbers £82433 
Name IDs M M * 4292 Bench Warrant of Arr 
I Last: MULVEY First; MICHAEL Mid: JQHN> i 
1 Addrt £68 SOUTH-iST WEST PG BOX 631 Phone: (331) - I 
I City 1 WQNTICELLO ST: UT Zip: a*333 DOBs 99/13/79 SSN: 343-96-3156 » 
I I 
Tine/Date of Events 0S:07si0 12/89/99 Treatment Date; t s / /m 
Type of event: ADM Adainistrative Instructions 
Quantity: 9. M 
Officeri GRAYSON BBDD 
Booking Number; 
Description: 
(See below) 
Description! 
REGARDING JAWE8 EATON HOMICIDE-CASE *99®4~93 
I interviewed Michael Mulvey by telephone on Deceabtr £7f 1999 at 
1009 hrst He releated the following to me while he was housed with 
Jordan Calliha*. 
1. Jordan stated to hi© that hef his brother, and his girlfrxeno took 
the vietie to a "country road". 
2. Jordan stated that hef his brother, and girlfriend were present when 
the victia was killed* 
3- Jordan stated that he wanted to take the rap so his brother 
could get off. 
EQR. 
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Fr-i Dec 24 09:81x25 WST 1999-INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD RASG II / ^ v ^ 
"" I interviewed Richard Raso on Deceeber 23 at 1&8Q hours at the San 
Juan County jail» Richard has lived with Jordan Callihae the last 
two nonths* Richard stated to ae the following: l* 
i. Jordan told hie that the killing was over aoney owed hia for a 1/4* 
warijuana. 
2. Jordan stated to hia that he, his brother, and his girlfriend took 
the victim on a road between Montieello and the Colorado state line 
and shot hie 19 tiaes. Jordan also stated that he and his brother 
took the victia while the girl stayed at the vehicle. 
3. Jordan stated that the victim was his best friend but that he got 
what he deserved* 
4. Jordan stated that one of the guns was a Saith and Wesson 9 an Sigea 
and told Raso "How can Zftoy find the gun when it was burned up". 
5. Jordan stated that after the shooting hie and his brother split up 
and went in different directions. 
6. Raso demonstrated the action Jordan showed hi« he used in the 
shooting of the fireara, pointing the pointer finger forward and the 
thuab up. He then turned the gun on its side while indicating a + 
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shooting notion with his hand. 
7. Jordan denonstated to Raso the body notions of the victie as he was 
being shot. The victim was standing with his a m i in front of his 
chest, ooving backwards, with alternating shoulders shifting 
backwards. Raso used the word "he vibrated" in describing how 
Jordan appeared as he was deaonstating how the victia looked while 
he was shooting. 
8. Jordan showed Raso the area he shot the victie by using his hands, 
covering and area froa the hips up to the shoulders. 
13. ftleohol or drug involvenents 
14- Additional information: 
IS. Date, Tine, Reporting Officers 
lEXT/PREM/UP/DOWN/BBBSN/END-Move, M»Mark, P«Print, L£FT,RIGHT=Skip to ~L 
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A. My name is Michael Mulvey. 
Washington State. 
this 
Q. Mike, were you a resident oJ 
facility as a county prisoner— 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. I was. 
—in the last six months? 
Yes, sir. I was. 
Ifm prese 
I the San 
Were you in this facility during the 
Jordan Calliham was in this facility? 
Call 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. I was. 
Were you housed in the same 
iham? 
A. 
Q. 
Grayson 
Yes, sir. I was. 
cellblock 
ntly living in 
Juan County of 
same time that 
as Mr. 
Do you recall having a conversation with Deputy 
Redd about some comments that 
Jordan Calliham? 
been 
what 
were 
A. 
Q. 
in 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
Do you recall approximately 
were made 
when that 
the last couple of weeks? Last month? 
Yeah. Last couple of weeks, 
Did you make a statement to 
you heard? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. I did. 
Can you tell us the context 
Mr. Redd, 
to you by 
was? Has that 
What? 
with regard to 
of the statements that 
made to you by Jordan? Did you ask him something? 
J . M. LIDDELL 
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1 A. No. I was curious why he was in here cause I mean 
2 he looked like a younger individual for being in the county 
3 jail, you know. 
4 Q. Okay. So my question was did you ask him that 
5 question? 
6 A. Yes, sir. I did. 
7 Q. All right. Did you make the statement to Grayson 
8 Redd that Jordan Calliham stated to you that he and his 
9 girlfriend took a victim to a country road? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you make a statement to Grayson Redd that Jordan 
12 Calliham said to you that he and his girlfriend were present 
13 when the victim was killed? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15 Q. And were those statements made to you by Jordan 
16 Calliham? 
17 A. Yes, sir. 
18 MR. HALLS: I have nothing further. 
19 THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. McCaughey? 
20 MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
21 THE COURT: Any questions, Mz. Morgan? 
22 MZ. MORGAN: Yes. 
2 3 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 4 BY MZ. MORGAN: 
25 Q. How old are you? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
| A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
probably 
admissibl 
jail. 
admissibl 
Q 
correct? 
Q. 
access to 
A. 
Q. 
paper wor 
Ifm 20. 
20 years old? 
Yes, mam. 
And you were doing how much time? 
42 days. 
42 days for—? 
DUI. 
MR. HALLS: I really think, Your Honor, that that's 
not something that should have come because it's— 
THE COURT: Yeah. That's really—that's not 
e. 
MR. HALLS: But he was in jail. They know he was in 
THE COURT: Not much harm done. That's not 
e. 
BY MZ. MORGAN: You were in the county section; 
THE WITNESS: Yes mam. 
And so all the beds are in there and everybody has 
everybody else's stuff? 
Pretty much. Yes, mam. 
So if Jordan Calliham had his paper work, his legal 
k, his discovery information that I would have sent 
to him under his bed, you would have had access to that; 
correct? 
J . M. LIDDELL 
1 A. No mam. 
2 Q. And why is that? 
3 A. Because he had a lot of friends in the county jail. 
4 Q. But the paper work was under the bed; correct? 
5 A. Yes, man. 
6 Q. And there were times when you were in the room and 
7 Jordan was outside of the room, for example, visiting; 
8 correct? 
9 A. Yes, mam. 
10 Q, You have some felony convictions on your record; 
11 correct? 
12 A. Juvenile record. Yes, mam. 
13 Q. And they were for what? 
14 A. Burglaries. 
15 Q. And this last sentence that youfve just served, you 
16 were released 10 days early; correct? 
17 A. Urn— 
18 Q. You got good time credit for 10 days? 
19 A. No, mam. 
20 Q. You didn't get good time credit? 
21 A. No, I didn't. I had to pay an extra—I believe it 
22 was an extra $50 to get out a day early. 
23 Q. But you didn't also get 10 days good time. 
24 A, Not that I was aware of. 
25 Q. Did you serve 42 days? 
J. M. LIDDELL r>7\ r'TT 1 Q "2 
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I A* 
county 
Yes, mam. Or actually I served 41 days in the 
jail. 
MZ. MORGAN: No further questions. 
MR. HALLS: No further questions. May this witness 
be excused? 
you'll 
you are 
the tru 
you God 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, we call Richard Raso. 
(Bailiff summoned witness from outside courtroom.) 
MR. HALLS: Stand right here and be sworn. And then 
have to sit right there. 
RICHARD RASO 
called by the Plaintiff, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
th, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
7 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Sit over here, Mr. Raso. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALLS: 
State your name and where you reside. 
My name is Richard Raso. I live in Salt Lake City. 
Mr. Raso, have you been a former resident of the San 
Juan County Jail? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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A. Urn, yes. 
Q. Were you in the county jail at the same time that 
Jordan Calliham was in the county jail? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you share some cell space or did you share 
what—what do you call it? Your house? Did you share your 
room? 
A. Yeah. My room with him, yeah. A couple of times. 
Q. During the time that you shared space with him, did 
he make any statements to you about the reason for him being 
in the San Juan County Jail? 
A. Yeah. He told me why he was here. 
Q. And how did that come up. Ifm not asking you for 
the statements. But did you ask him? Did he volunteer it? 
How did that come up? 
A. Urn, just when you sit in jail, you know, people talk 
and ask each other questions and stuff and that's how it came 
up. 
Q, Mr. Raso, I think I was the reason why you were in 
jail, but I can't remember whether it was for a felony or not. 
Were you in for a felony? 
A. It started out that way and I pleaded down to a 
misdemeanor. So I was in jail for—actually I was in jail for 
a probation violation. 
Q. All right. And do you recall having an interview 
J . M. LIDDELL n 7 \ ^ T 7 1 Q ; 
I with Grayson Redd about the statements that Mr. Jordan 
Calliham made to you? 
A. Yeah. It was like— 
THE COURT: Would you just move up and a little 
closer to that microphone so we can here better? 
THE WITNESS: it was like—it was like two weeks 
ago. 
Q BY MR. HALLS: Okay. We are trying to make sure 
that the jury can here this. Ifm looking at a note here that 
said it was on December 23rd. 
A. Yeah. It was. 
Q. Does that—does that seem—that was right? 
A. Um-hm. 
Q. All right. Do you recall telling Grayson Redd that 
Jordan told you that the killing was over money owed him for a 
quarter pound of marijuana? 
A. He told me that's what he was being charged with, 
yeah. 
Q. Okay. So he made that statement with you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. Do you recall telling Grayson Redd that 
Jordan stated that he, his girlfriend took the victim on a 
road between Monticello and the Colorado state line, shot him 
19 times, and that while that was occurring his girlfriend had 
stayed at the vehicle? Did you make that statement to Grayson 
J. M. LIDDELL PACK Ififi 
Redd? 
A. Ah, I told him that--
Q. I!m asking if you made that statement. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That can be answered by a yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember Jordan stating to you—did you state 
to Grayson Redd that Jordan stated to you that the victim was 
his best friend, but that he got what he deserved? 
A. Yes. He told me he was his best friend. 
Q. Did Jordan tell you that the gun was a Smith & 
Wesson 9 Sigma? 
A. Ah, yeah. He told me that was the gun that 
supposedly did the— 
Q. Okay. And did he also say to you that "How can they 
find the gun when it was burned up?" 
A. Yeah. That came up one time in a conversation. 
Q, Did Jordan state that after the shooting he and his 
girlfriend went to Cortez or went some place? 
A. Urn, no. He never said that. He said—oh, how did 
he put it? Oh—that they had split up. 
Q. Let me go into another question. Did—did Jordan 
demonstrate to you how he had used the firearm— 
A. Yes. 
Q. —in committing what he told you was the act against 
J. M. LIDDELL nArr 1Q1 
James Eaton? 
A. 
said that 
Q. 
Urn, he didn't actually say thatfs what he did. He 
fs what they said he did. 
Did you demonstrate—did you demonstrate how he 
showed you that? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
like—he \ 
Q. 
was being 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
that—-
—like in 
Q. 
Yeah. I demonstrated it to the officer. 
Show us what you demonstrated. 
I was told that he, urn— 
Jordan told you this and he showed you this. 
And he told me that; that they said that he did it 
Aias going like that. 
(Indicated) 
Did he show you what the body looked like when it 
shot? 
Yeah, pretty much. 
Show me what you showed Grayson Redd. 
Just that his body was shakin1. 
Why don't you stand up and show me? 
Just that when the bullets hit, he was going like 
(Indicated) 
a vibrating motion. 
When you stood up and did that a moment ago, you 
showed the hands in front of your chest; is that the way he 
shewed you? 
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Q. 
forth as 
A. 
moved. 
Q. 
Um-hm. Yeah. 
And he showed you that the person was going back and 
he was being shot? 
Yeah. Well not back and forth. He just said he 
Did you indicate to Grayson Redd—did you use the 
words that he vibrated? 
A. 
Q. 
this with 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah. 
And while he was doing that, did he use a gun like 
the hand? Turn it sideways? 
(Indicated) 
No. That was two different conversation. 
Okay. In the other conversation did he do this? 
(Indicated) 
Yeah. 
Did Jordan Calliham show you the area on the body of 
the victim where he was shot? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Urn, he said it was in this area. 
(Indicated) 
How did he do that? 
Just showed me. 
Show me how he showed you. 
He just said that it was just like in this area. 
(Indicated) 
Now Mr. Raso, the statements that we have just 
J . M. LIDDELL 
1 talked about, you gave in an interview to Grayson Redd. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And are those statements as we have described them 
4 true? You're saying that that is your testimony today under 
5 oath? 
6 A. Yeah. 
7 MR. HALLS: No further questions. 
8 MR. McCAUGHEY: No questions. 
9 CROSS EXAMINATION 
10 BY MZ. MORGAN: 
11 Q. Mr. Raso, how old are you? 
12 A. Ifm 28. 
13 Q. You have a number of felony convictions on your 
14 record; correct? 
15 A. Yes, I do. 
16 Q. Can you go over them with me? Do you know how many 
17 felony convictions you have? 
18 A, Ah, I have exactly—I think I have one conviction. 
19 Ifve been charged with several felonies though. Ifm pretty 
20 sure I only have one conviction. 
21 Q. And what is that conviction for? 
22 A. Burglary of a dwelling. 
23 Q. And when was that? 
24 A. 10 years ago—8 years ago—9 years ago. 
25 Q. You shared a room with Jordan; correct? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And so if he had legal paper work under his bed like 
the preliminary hearing transcript,— 
A. Um-hm. 
Q. —you would have had access to that information, 
wouldn't you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You were sentenced to do six months? 
A. Um-hm. 
Q. But you didn't do six months, did you? 
A. No. I did almost five. 
Q. You got out right before Christmas, didn't you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. They let you out early. 
A. Um-hm. 
MZ. MORGAN: No further questions. 
MR. HALLS: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can go. Thank you. 
MR. HALLS: May this witness be excused? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HALLS: I call Adrian Killsinsight. 
THE COURT: Is this the last one of these kinds of 
witnesses, Mr. Halls? I'm just wondering about taking a 
recess. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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not---
would be 
MR. HALLS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HALLS: 
a good time 
Your Honor— 
Is there short witnesses? 
It is. This is a short wi 
to take a recess after this 
We've got another one, but I—he's not 
We're—we're kind of 
recess, 
oath. 
you 
the 
you 
are 
we could— 
wondering why. But maybe i 
(Bailiff summoned witness from outside 
THE COURT: 
called by 
Raise your righthand here 
ADRIAN KILLSINSIGHT 
the Plaintiff, having been 
I — if it's 
tness. It 
witness. 
here. 
f we took a 
courtroom.) 
and take the 
duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
about to give in the case now before the 
truth, the whole 
God? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
truth, and nothing but the 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Sit over here. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALLS: 
State state your name and where you 
Adrian Killsinsight. 
Where do you live? 
the testimony 
Court will be 
truth, so help 
reside? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
1 A. In Blanding. 
2 Q. Adrian, are you a former resident of this county 
3 facility at the jail here? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. You were here for awhile? 
6 A. Yeah. 
7 Q. Were you—were you here for a felony? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. What was the felony? 
10 A. Burglary and theft. 
11 Q. Were you housed in the same cellblock or the same 
12 housing unit as Jordan Calliham? 
13 A. Yeah. 
14 Q. During the time that you were housed in the same 
15 cellblock with Mr. Calliham did he make statements about why 
16 he was in the San Juan County Jail? 
17 A. Oh, yeah. 
18 Q. Okay. And you heard—you heard some of these 
19 statements and you've given those statements to Grayson Redd; 
20 is that correct? 
21 A. Yeah. 
22 Q. Did you make that statement to Grayson Redd within 
23 the last couple of weeks? 
2 4 A. Urn, yeah. 
25 Q. Adrian, did you tell Grayson Redd that Jordan stated 
J. M. LIDDELL 
that he had killed the victim? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you state that Jordan stated that he had went 
into the woods and shot him up? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you demonstrate to Grayson Redd how he held his 
hand— 
A. Yes. 
Q. —in telling you what he had done? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Would you demonstrate that for the jury. 
A. He went like this and this— 
(Indicated). 
—like he shot off, urn, bullets. 
Q. The first thing is he puts his hand like this— 
(Indicated) 
—and then he turns it sideways— 
A. Yeah. 
Q. —and does this motion? 
(Indicated) 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Ah, did Jordan state to you or did you make this 
statement to Grayson Redd that he capped him because he owed 
him $300 for coke? 
A. Yeah. 
J. M. LIDDELL Dnri: i Q A 
1 Q- Did you make the statement to Grayson Redd that 
2 Jordan stated that he had tortured him, that he had shot him 
3 up? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. And are those statements statements that were made 
6 by Jordan Calliham to you, personally? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 MR. HALLS: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
9 MR. McCAUGHEY: No questions. 
10 MR. HALLS: Ah,--
11 MZ. MORGAN: I'm fine. We've got time. 
12 MR. HALLS: All right. 
13 CROSS EXAMINATION 
14 BY MZ. MORGAN: 
15 Q. Your bunk was next to Jordan's; correct? 
16 (Witness nodded affirmative.) 
17 So you would have had ample access to any legal 
18 paper work that he may have had; right? 
19 A. Yeah. Could have. But I didn't. 
20 Q. So you didn't read the information he had under his 
21 bed about this case. 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. When you first talked to the officer, you said that, 
24 urn, what Jordan had stated was that he was supposed to have 
25 killed the boy and then the officer encouraged you to tell 
J . M. LIDDELL •n> 7\ / T " » 
more and then you changed your story and said, "Well he said 
hefd killed the boy;" is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. So if thatfs what the officers report says, the 
officer has made a mistake. 
A. Yeah. 
MZ. MORGAN: Okay. No further questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALLS: 
Q. Adrian,— 
A. Yeah. 
Q. —you were reluctant to come here to testify today, 
weren't you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You didn't want to do that. 
A. No. 
Q. At one point, when you started talking tcJ Grayson 
Redd, you told him that you didn't know anything about it, 
didn't you? 
A. Um-hm. 
Q. But you do. Are the statements that you've made 
here today that we just went through that you got from Jordan 
Shumway—Jordan—excuse me. Jordan Shumway is somebody I grew 
up with, so Jordan Calliham. Are those statements that you've 
made? 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. Did he make those? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You heard them? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. He made them to you? 
A. Yeah. 
MR. HALLS: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Step down. Thank you. 
MR. HALLS: May this witness be excused, Your Honor? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Yes. 
MZ. MORGAN: No objection. 
THE COURT: All right. This witness is excused. 
We'll take a 15-minute recess. Members of the jury, 
during that recess don't discuss this case with anyone. Don't 
allow anyone to discuss this it in your presence. Don't make 
up your mind as to any issue until it's finally submitted to 
you for decision. We'll be in recess. 
(Recess) 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT 
THE COURT: The record will show members of the jury 
are present, counsel are present, the defendants are present. 
Mr. Halls, your next witness. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, what I need to indicate to 
the Court is that I've got a couple of more witnesses that I 
J. M. LIDDELL 
